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**EISENHOWER AS STRATEGIST:
THE COHERENT USE OF MILITARY
POWER IN WAR AND PEACE**

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


Steven Metz

**Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College**

Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. Six

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“Strategy in Periods of Transition”

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* * * * *

This study is dedicated to COL Denny Quinn, who first prodded me toward things strategic, LTC Fred Downey and LTC Bob Walz who helped keep me stumbling along the path, and Jayne, who rode herd on Rachel and Stephanie so that I could write evenings and weekends (sometimes!).

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
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FOREWORD

The facts of Dwight D. Eisenhower's military career are well-known. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained from a careful examination of his experience.

Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions—he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Eisenhower was directly involved in a number of major transitions including the building of the wartime American Army, its demobilization following the war, and the resuscitation of American military strength during the initial years of the cold war.

This means that Eisenhower's career can provide important lessons on how a coherent strategy should and should not be built during times of strategic transition. That is what this monograph begins to do. It is not intended to be a biography in the usual sense and thus offers no new facts or insights into Eisenhower's life. Instead it uses that life as a backdrop for exploring the broader essence of strategic coherence and draws lessons from Eisenhower's career that can help guide the strategic transition which the U.S. military now faces.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'William A. Stofft', with a horizontal line drawn through the middle of the signature.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Reluctant Strategist.

In December 1941, Dwight Eisenhower was ordered to report for duty at the War Plans Division (OPD) of the War Department in Washington and thus began his ascent to the pinnacle of American strategy. Like many soldiers, this was not a journey he approached with enthusiasm. Eisenhower felt that having missed combat in World War I hindered his career, and so found assignment to the War Department "a hard blow."¹ But despite a plea to Brigadier General Haislip, Chief of the Personnel Division, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall insisted Eisenhower was the proper man for the job.² "By General Marshall's word," Eisenhower feared, "I was completely condemned to a desk job in Washington for the duration."³

Eisenhower's anxiety did not come solely from careerism. He knew that his training and experience only partially prepared him for the complexity, subtlety, ambiguity, and frequent confusion of high-level strategy. Though confident of his soldierly skills, he was not so automatically sure of his ability in a realm where political acumen and horizontal leadership mattered more than vertical command relationships. Confidence there would come later.

During his first week in Washington, a frustrated Eisenhower wrote in his diary: "There are lots of amateur strategists on the job, and prima donnas everywhere. I'd give anything to be back in the field."⁴ This says much about Eisenhower's personality and his rather peculiar path to positions of strategic leadership and power. This reluctant strategist never exhibited the uninhibited, Nietzschean quest

for power that propelled an Alexander, Napoleon, or Hitler. He was not "driven by a ruthless daemon" like Marlborough.⁵ Eisenhower's life was devoid of the *noblesse oblige* and sense of historic destiny seen in Churchill, Metternich, or Franklin Roosevelt. And, Eisenhower was not a Kissinger, drawn first to the theoretical intricacies of strategy, its abstract architecture and attractions, and then later tempted into the corridors of power. Why, then, did he become a strategist?

The common answer is a deep and moving sense of duty. Through Eisenhower's own writing and that of admirers, we are presented the image of a simple soldier unwillingly burdened with the mantle of strategist. Kenneth S. Davis, for example, attributed Eisenhower with "a selfless devotion to duty which set him completely apart from those ambitious officers who, in the swiftly expanding Army, sought opportunities for personal advancement."⁶ It is misleading, though, to push this myth too far—sometimes duty is simply ambition in defilade. But Eisenhower is like Robert E. Lee: historians can note flaws in judgement or intelligence (so long as they do it gently), but his motives are usually considered beyond reproach.

If there is a precursor for Eisenhower's path to power, it may be Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor, too, was originally driven to power by duty (albeit duty to the *junker* class and its Hohenzollern dynasty rather than the nation as a whole). But again like Bismarck, once Eisenhower tasted power, he was addicted. Any anxiety about the travails of politics, diplomacy, and horizontal leadership evaporated. He found strategy intoxicating and quickly developed competence.

This was not really surprising; Eisenhower was at least as well prepared as most of his contemporaries for the direction of global strategy.⁷ The Army Command and General Staff College and War College had introduced him to the strategic dimensions of military thinking.⁸ Eisenhower augmented this formal education with a rigorous course of self-study on strategic theory and history. While executive officer of the 20th Infantry Brigade at Camp Gaillard in the Panama Canal Zone, in particular, he began serious consideration of the strategic decisions of the Civil War and Clausewitz's *On War*.⁹

Several assignments gave Eisenhower strategic experience of a sort. Following completion of the War College in 1928, he served as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War and dealt with global issues. During the late 1930s, he was senior military assistant to Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. This forced him to consider alternative strategies of national defense and methods for building, training, and equipping armies (as well as the frustrations of dealing with powerful, eccentric personalities). His post-1941 military posts, crowned by command of Allied forces in Europe and a term as Army Chief of Staff, further leavened the theoretical background with practical experience. Eisenhower, the simple soldier, thus transmuted into Eisenhower, the strategist.

The determination to master even unsavory tasks when duty demanded was an enduring trait of Eisenhower's character. Whether an unwilling strategist or not, this allowed him to transcend inhibitions and join the ranks of more naturally enthusiastic strategists like Churchill or Napoleon. Throughout his career, Eisenhower turned personal strengths into strategic skill. But the translation was not perfect.

Edward Luttwak has described strategy as a realm dominated by paradox. Since strategy pits at least two thinking, scheming, conflicting antagonists, what appears best often is not and what works one day soon will not.¹⁰ This paradoxical nature of strategy flavored Eisenhower's career as strategist. Many of the same perceptions, attitudes, and techniques that brought him success in some dimensions of strategy became hindrances in others. In the end, his pursuit of strategic mastery was incomplete.

Analyzing Strategy.

Americans tend to associate strategy with a formal plan. They see it as something that emerges from a byzantine process of coordination and review to be approved by appropriate authorities, assigned a document number, and distributed. Lower echelons then take the newly sacrosanct document, craft miniature replicas, and apply them. This

attitude clearly reflects our political culture and our bureaucratized approach to planning in general.¹¹ It also represents an obstacle to true strategic acumen. We should see strategy as a consistent and long-term method of problem-solving. The phrase "a strategic approach to planning" reflects a deeper understanding than does "*the* national security strategy." It shows a grasp of the fluidity of strategy, of its relativity, and, most of all, it indicates that strategy is a deliberately patterned way of approaching problems rather than the output of the process.

From this perspective, strategy can be defined as order extended in time, space, and milieu. It attempts to impose order in a disorderly environment of thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities. Strategy is the organized and deliberate use of power resources to attain, protect, or promote goals with a minimum of waste and a maximum chance of success. In the national security realm, all nations define goals and use the elements of national power—economic, political, military, and psychological—to attain them, but not all nations do it in a consistently strategic fashion. If a state chooses a strategic approach to its security problems, chaotic, *ad hoc*, and disorganized applications of national power are, to a varying extent, replaced with orderly ones. As a result, efficiency increases.

Strategy *making* entails defining objectives, priorities, methods, concepts and techniques; planning the mobilization and sustainment of power resources; shaping attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, values, and morale; and crafting an organization to flesh out the strategic framework and oversee its implementation. A proficient strategist attempts to assure that these things are done with efficiency and effectiveness. A strategic genius assures that these things are done with maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

The intricate and enigmatic nature of strategy makes it difficult to analyze. Efficiency can be measured with some certainty in mechanical systems, but not so easily in the world of strategy. How, then, to assess the quality of a strategy? The simplest solution is to define quality as *success*. Strategies that succeeded were of high quality; those that failed were not.

Although this is easy, it is unsatisfactory. A good argument can be made that even the best possible strategies sometimes fail and an astrategic approach sometimes succeeds. While all strategists seek success, even extremely talented ones may not always attain it. In addition, using success as the central criterion may work for historical analysis, but is of little help in assessing the coherence of an existing or emerging strategy. The only way out of this dilemma is to find an analytical technique, heuristic device, or framework which does not rely on success or failure.

Characteristics.

The first step is to delineate features which characterize a coherent strategy, one that maximizes efficiency and effectiveness. Admittedly, there is an epistemological problem here. The linkage of certain characteristics to certain outcomes in the past does not produce a general law. We can suppose but not prove, according to the philosopher David Hume, that there is a resemblance between relationships with which we have experience or knowledge such as history and "those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery," including the future.¹² The nature of conflict or, at least, ways of understanding and approaching it do change. Thus it is possible that a feature which characterized sound strategies in the past may not do so in the future.

The best response to this problem is to bypass it and assume that what has worked in the past usually will work in the future, at least at the level of general features and broad patterns. Given this, it is possible to distill a reasonable list of the characteristics of a sound strategy—order, initiative, etc. But to really get at the heart of the problem, such a list must be further subdivided.

Some of the characteristics of a coherent strategy, for example, are *linear*. These are features, characteristics, or physical things where more is generally better. Strategists attempt to maximize them, at least to the point where the costs of increase outweigh expected gains. An example of a linear characteristic is *synchronization*, the coordination and

meshing of different types of power and of related activities within a power type. For grand strategy this means that political, psychological, military, and economic components support one another or, at least, do not detract from the effectiveness of the other. For military strategy, air, sea, and land efforts must complement each other. For a coalition strategy, whether grand or military, synchronization means coordinating the activities of allies. Overall, synchronization entails a clear notion of timing and phasing. Resources must be applied in an order that maximizes effectiveness. In an even broader sense, mobilization of resources must be synchronized with their application. More synchronization is usually better than less, up to the point where further increases are not worth their cost.

Other linear characteristics include:

- UNDERSTANDING of self, allies, and enemies.
- CLARITY of goals, priorities, level of acceptable risk, relationship of means and ends.
- ORDER in the application of power and in the planning process.
- INITIATIVE.
- MORALE.
- SKILL of the implementors of strategic decisions.
- INTELLIGENCE and INFORMATION.
- SUPPORT by key leaders, elites, and publics.
- DETAILED sub-plans and contingency plans, (i.e., "What if?" thinking).

The second component of a coherent strategy is the *dyadic*. This involves maintaining harmony or managing dissonance between diametric facets of strategy. Boldness is an example. Clausewitz argues that a soldier "can possess no nobler quality," but also noted that boldness had "to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into

purposeless bursts of blind passion."¹¹ The key is balance or harmony among dyadic or polar features (see Figure 1).

Mitigators.

Clausewitz argued that in war there is an inherent tendency toward escalating violence.¹² In the realm of pure logic, this would have no limit other than the physical and human resources of the antagonists. The destructiveness of wars would inextricably spiral toward exhaustion or destruction. In practice, however, a number of factors temper the tendency toward escalation. Foremost among them is the rationality of policymakers and strategists as they recognize the need for proportion between effort expended and expected gain. This same logic holds for the development of a sound strategy. A good strategist knows, at least in an inchoate and instinctive way, that he needs to maximize linear characteristics and




Figure 1.

balance or harmonize dyadic ones. But a panoply of factors mitigate the ability of the strategist to do this. These mitigators are an important element of strategic analysis.

Often flaws or shortcomings in the character or intellect of the strategist or strategists serve as mitigators. This is particularly true in the dyadic realm. Even a Napoleon or Alexander could not be equally agile and persistent, hard and soft, aggressive and cautious. Martin van Crevald notes, "though nothing is more important in war than unity of command, it is impossible for one man to know everything."¹⁵ He might also have added that it is impossible for one man to be everything and difficult to do the correct thing at the proper time. Strategists may occasionally transcend their own limitations by swerving from their usual ways, but this is always short-lived. Diametrics resurface and erode the coherence of strategy.

Sustained strategic success demands that key strategists form symbiotic relationships with others whose talents and personalities are different, thus generating a balance of diametrics. This is easier for the analyst to see than for the strategist to do. It is difficult for powerful men to recognize their own shortcomings and take concrete actions to compensate. This is the reason that flaws or shortcomings in the intellect or personality of strategists often mitigate against a maximum level of coherence in their plans and actions.

The organization by which strategy is made, implemented, and adjusted can also serve as a mitigator. Again, dyadic elements are the most difficult. Unless an organization delicately balances centralization and decentralization, formality and informality, and well-developed plans with flexible procedures, the output—the strategy itself—will suffer. Bureaucratic decisionmaking, which stresses consensus-building rather than the inherent coherence of outputs, can erode the effectiveness of strategy. In addition, faulty methods for staffing the organization can detract from the coherence of the strategy. Power and responsibility tend to accrue to individuals who master the intricacies of the bureaucratic process rather than the intricacies of strategy. The criteria

which key strategists use to staff their organizations thus affect the coherence of the strategy itself.

Finally, strategic culture and the political climate can mitigate strategic coherence. Strategic culture is composed of the preferences, values, perceptions, and attitudes that delimit the use of force in pursuit of national goals.¹⁰ It grows from a nation's historical experience, ideology, and methods of political and economic organization. Strategic culture affects both ultimate ends and acceptable means for the application of power. Strategic culture also determines the extent to which the public and other groups and organizations not directly involved in strategy-making affect the process. For democracies, the openness of the decisionmaking process and the dispersal of political power often mitigate against strategic coherence.

In describing great generals, J.F.C. Fuller claimed that they invariably "understood their age."¹¹ But understanding itself does not automatically allow strategists to transcend the limitations of their age. The political climate—the way that elites and publics define the national interest and the price they will pay to attain it—can be controlled or manipulated, but not easily. Given this, a coherent strategy incorporates a program of building and sustaining support or acquiescence for the strategy. Internally, this focuses on key elites and, in open democracies, on the mass public. Externally, support or acquiescence is sought from allies and neutrals. Both internally and externally, this is done by crafting efficacious images of the conflict and disseminating them. A program of mobilizing and sustaining support requires continual adjustment.

Assessment.

Final assessment of a strategy comes from comparing its inherent coherence with its mitigators. The key question is: Did the strategist or strategists maximize the coherence of the strategy given the mitigators? Did they, in other words, do all that they could? (See Figure 2.) If the answer to the final question is "yes," the chances of success are maximized, but

not guaranteed. To maximize linear elements, to balance dyadic ones, to transcend mitigators—all are difficult and sometimes impossible tasks.

Eisenhower's career provides an excellent laboratory to illustrate this method of assessing strategy. During this time in uniform, he was warfighter and deterrer. To some extent, he succeeded in both realms. But whether as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, Chief of Staff of the Army, or Commander of NATO, Eisenhower did not pursue strategic coherence in any sort of deliberate, planned fashion. There is little abstract theorizing about the features of a quality strategy anywhere in his massive writings. In line with his pervasive pragmatism, he did craft rules-of-thumb and guidelines. In composite, these indicate an intuitive feel for the elements of a sound military strategy and illustrate the obstacles to maximizing its effectiveness and efficiency.




Figure 2.

CHAPTER 2

WARFIGHTING

Introduction.

At the outbreak of World War II, Eisenhower was one of a number of U.S. military officers who had spent decades preparing for the opportunity they now faced. But even among the large group of untested senior leaders, Eisenhower had shown special talent for important tasks.¹⁸ The war was to provide the perfect context for the first blossoming of his strategic talent. In warfighting strategy, dyadic balances illustrated in Figure 1 are important, sometimes crucial, but the linear component is usually even more vital. The key tasks are to seize, hold, and destroy, all of which are done easier with *more* forces and materiel, and superior morale. Since Eisenhower was especially strong in the linear component of strategic coherence, he proved to be a first-rate warfighting strategist, especially in the peculiar variant of war fought by coalitions of open democracies.

Context.

The basic contours of Allied strategy took shape quickly after the entry of the United States into the war. After all, American involvement was not really a surprise, and thus Roosevelt and key advisers like George Marshall had adequate time to consider key issues. The British, with 2 years' experience fighting Hitler and a much richer strategic tradition than the United States, provided the foundation and dominated the initial period of strategic consensus-building.

The most fundamental strategic question of all—which enemy should receive priority—was answered before the U.S. entered the war. A series of American-British staff

conversations from January to March 1941 led to the conclusion that defeat of Germany should be the first objective of the Western Allies.¹⁹ This was reinforced during Roosevelt's first meeting with the British after Pearl Harbor at the ARCADIA Conference (December 1941). What remained for the planners, then, was the fleshing out of this strategic construct and the development of realistic methods to apply it.

Again the British were the driving force. Winston Churchill had prepared a series of papers calling for a three-phase strategy.²⁰ The first phase was "closing the ring." This called for attacks around the periphery of the Nazi empire and an economic blockade. The culmination was to be an invasion of French North Africa in 1942. The second phase was "liberating the populations." While this would eventually require the invasion of Europe, Churchill stressed the provision of aid to resistance movements in German-occupied countries. The British Army would only cross the channel to administer the *coup de grace* once resistance movements in the occupied countries weakened the Nazis.²¹ The last phase of the strategy would be a direct assault on Germany. With some additional development, this plan became Allied strategy. In the initial phase, the strategic bombing campaign and support to Russia also became crucial elements. Furthermore, much of Allied strategy focused on the mechanics of the buildup of American and British military power which Churchill's plan implied but did not spell out.

Despite American and British consensus over the broad contours of military strategy, there were serious debates between them. Three were most persistent. The first concerned the emphasis given peripheral operations, especially in the Mediterranean. London was consistently more enthusiastic about these than Washington. Because the British remained the more influential partner in strategy-making until 1943, they won debates concerning the invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH), Sicily (Operation HUSKY), and Italy (Operation SHINGLE) despite American objections. "To the American military chiefs," Kent Roberts Greenfield wrote, "TORCH meant that Allied strategy had been diverted from the highroad to victory into a dead-end theater from which no

decisive blow at Germany could ever be delivered."²² Although American planners saw these peripheral operations as distractions from preparation for the direct assault on the continent, they reluctantly agreed when it became clear that resources for a cross-channel invasion would not be available in 1942 or 1943. Eventually the phenomenal productive capacity of the United States allowed the Allies to pursue peripheral operations in the Mediterranean *and* deploy adequate resources for the cross-channel invasion.

The second debate concerned the timing of the cross-channel invasion with the British advocating delay as long as possible to allow peripheral operations, the strategic bombing campaigns, the resistance movements, and the Russians to weaken Germany. The third was over the degree of centralized authority given the Allied Supreme Commander. The British tended to advocate a large measure of autonomy for component commanders with the Supreme Commander operating like a chairman of the board; Americans favored greater control by the Supreme Commander.

Eventually, control of Allied strategy shifted. By the Cairo and Teheran conferences of 1943, the Americans had overcome their initially ad hoc approach to joint and combined planning and were providing the bulk of the resources to the Western Alliance. The emergence of Eisenhower as an influential and successful leader also helped. As a result, the Americans came to dominate Alliance strategy and return it to the more aggressive and direct approach they favored.²³

For the invasion of the continent, the first objective was defined functionally: gain air superiority. This was followed by the landing, the consolidation of the beachhead and its buildup. After the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, Allied planners expected the Germans to regroup and defend the Seine and Somme, and later along the Siegfried Line of prepared defenses and the Rhine.²⁴ Western forces were to breach these in a broad-front offensive with emphasis on the left or northern wing, destroying as many enemy forces as possible.²⁵ At the same time, they were to seize high capacity ports such as Antwerp. Once they cleared the Germans from France, Allied forces were to pause, gather supplies,

exterminate Nazi forces remaining west of the Rhine, develop bridgeheads across the river, implement a double envelopment of the Ruhr, and then fan out across Germany. Immediately after the breakout, the main advance was along the line Amiens-Maubeuge-Liege-the Ruhr, and the secondary advance in the south along the line Verdun-Metz. An invasion of southern France, an offensive in Italy, aid to the Soviets, and an escalated strategic bombing campaign supported this main attack. The consolidating sweep across Germany was to complete the plan and prevent the Nazi forces from retreating to the so-called "national redoubt" in the Alps where, it was feared, they would instigate guerrilla warfare.

This plan was developed before the invasion of Normandy and implemented almost exactly as drawn. According to Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, "...I do not believe a great campaign has ever been fought before with so little change in its original strategic plan."²⁶ Again, though, there were enduring debates, sometimes among the Americans but more frequently between the British and Americans. The most persistent of these pitted advocates of the broad-front offensive against those favoring a single narrow thrust into Germany following the breakout from Normandy. Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of British 21st Army Group, was the most dogged supporter of the narrow thrust. Immediately after the breakout in August, Montgomery requested that the advance of Patton's Third Army in the south be halted, the Allied Airborne Army and the U.S. First Army be assigned to him, and all available supplies be given to his newly enlarged army group which would then press toward Berlin before the Germans could consolidate their defenses. At the same time, Patton asked for priority on supplies. This, according to the American general, would follow the old military axiom of reinforcing success, since the Third Army had advanced much more rapidly than Montgomery's command. Throughout the remainder of the campaign, Montgomery, in particular, repeated his request for reinforcement and a narrow front advance. Eisenhower, however, doggedly stuck to his broad-front strategy aimed primarily at destroying Germany's military power.

Coherence.

The intrinsic coherence of Eisenhower's warfighting strategy can best be distilled from two periods in his career. The first was the time spent as a planner at the War Department in 1942. As a staff planner, Eisenhower developed a framework for a global military strategy in February 1942 and helped engineer the opening Allied offensives against Germany. Both projects were at the request of General Marshall. The February study analyzed the military implications of the "Germany first" decision. Eisenhower argued that to defeat the Nazis, the most immediate tasks were: the preservation of Great Britain and its sea links to the United States; keeping the Soviet Union in the war; and preventing an Axis take-over of India and the Middle East.²⁷

In March 1942, Eisenhower pushed this line of thinking even further in the first detailed blueprint for the Allied offensive against Germany. This included plans for Operation BOLERO, the buildup of forces and supplies in Britain; Operation ROUNDUP, a major cross-channel attack scheduled for April 1943; and Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, a smaller cross-channel contingency attack which could be launched before the buildup was complete if a Russian collapse seemed imminent or if Germany appeared on the verge of collapse.

The second period useful in analyzing the logic of Eisenhower's strategy is the time between the breakout from the Normandy beachhead and the surrender of Germany (August 1944-May 1945). While Eisenhower had been consulted on the key strategic decisions of the Mediterranean campaign, he did not make them. And, when given command of the cross-channel invasion, Eisenhower found that much solid planning had already been done under the direction of British Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan.²⁸ The broad tactical plans of Operation OVERLORD were completed and approved by the American-British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in August 1943.²⁹ Even given these parameters, Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander, began to play a central role in Allied decision making.³⁰ Vital decisions, especially those dealing with appointments to top staff and

command positions, remained. Thus Eisenhower's influence over the coherence or incoherence of Allied strategy increased markedly. In a very real sense, with the invasion at Normandy General Eisenhower passed from an adviser and implementor of strategy to its maker.

Eisenhower's skill as a strategist during these two periods must be considered separately. After all, the role of a strategic commander and of a staff strategist varies in some fundamental ways. For the commander, structure and psychology take on added importance. Leadership, to phrase it differently, is as important as logic. But even though a commander has more influence over actual strategy than most staff planners, few modern commanders attempt total control of strategy formulation. They know that even a Napoleon—whom Martin van Creveld called "the most competent human being who ever lived"—could only do that with transitory success.³¹ Thus the ability to select talented subordinate commanders and staff planners and to construct procedures to draw the best from them is as much a determinant of strategic coherence as the genius of the commander himself.

As both staff strategist and strategic commander, the linear component of coherence was Eisenhower's strength. This reflected a longstanding tradition in the U.S. Army. What Russell Weigley calls "the American way of war" first coalesced into a war-winning strategy under U.S. Grant. In this quintessentially American approach to conflict, more was always better—more men, more firepower, and more technology. Quantity was a surrogate for harmony and, often, for skill. The linear component thus dominated.

This "more is better" approach brought dividends. Eisenhower was, for example, a consistent advocate of clarity in strategic planning, whether clarity of priorities, objectives, or phases. He methodically developed a general notion of ultimate goals, defined preliminary objectives, avoided distractions, and delineated the limits of risk and cost for the attainment of objectives. "The first question that must be definitely decided," Eisenhower wrote to George Marshall in March 1942, "is the region or theater in which the first major offensive effort of the United Powers must take place."³² Once

a cross-channel invasion of Europe was defined as the key objective. Eisenhower steadfastly opposed other operations, however tantalizing, that would detract from it.³³

Eisenhower was also aware that the diffusion of authority in a coalition of democracies made focus on a given set of objectives extremely difficult. Distractions, bickering, and politics were rampant. This was frustrating for someone with an intuitive grasp of strategic coherence. In a note to himself while Deputy Chief for the Pacific and Far East of the War Plans Division, Eisenhower wrote:

The struggle to secure adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down. Everybody is too much engaged with small things of his own—or with some vague idea of larger political activity to realize what we are doing—or rather *not* doing.

We've got to get to Europe and fight—and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world—and still worse—wasting time. If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma, we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.³⁴

From the need to focus on given objectives, two key tasks in strategic planning emerge. The first is the clarification of the criteria used to define goals and set priorities. These often remain unspoken and vague; this mitigates against coherence, particularly in a situation where a large number of staff planners contribute vital components of the strategy. Coherence is augmented, in other words, when criteria are clarified.

Sometimes these criteria will be purely military. This, of course, is solidly within the American tradition. In 1942, for example, Eisenhower's rationale for the invasion of the European continent made no reference to restoring the global balance of power or the moral obligation to liberate democracies on the continent, but instead stressed more mundane (and perfectly logical) criteria. The paucity of Allied shipping, Eisenhower argued, supported the use of the shortest possible sea routes which ran from the American northeast to the British Isles. Furthermore, the railroads and highways in Western Europe could best support the sort of

rapid offensive the Allies envisaged, and Britain already had an airfield network.³⁵ Western Europe, in other words, was a developed theater while other potential avenues of advance were not.

After the invasion of the continent, Eisenhower again relied on purely military criteria to structure strategic decisions. He believed strongly that "destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle..."³⁶ Even when Eisenhower struck an area rather than the German army such as the envelopment of the Ruhr in 1945, the justification was the support that the region provided for the army and the likelihood that the main German military force would fight rather than surrender the region.³⁷ Like Richmond in the Civil War, the Ruhr was a center of gravity as much because the enemy attached importance to it as for its intrinsic value as a production, communications, and transportation node.

Even with the emphasis on purely military criteria for strategic decision making, Eisenhower was not un-Clausewitzian. No successful strategic-level commander—who by definition lives at the cusp of the military and political worlds—can be. The Allied Supreme Commander remained acutely aware of the linkage of policy and warmaking even while his natural inclination was to focus on military criteria for strategy making. During the debate surrounding Operation TORCH, for example, Eisenhower made clear that since the invasion of North Africa could distract the Allies from preparation for a cross-channel attack, he opposed it on military grounds. At the same time, he was sensitive enough to American public opinion, to the need to take the offensive against Germany to bolster national will, that he willingly acceded once Roosevelt decided in favor of the North Africa operation.³⁸

This same tendency—to rely on military criteria but defer to political factors when his superiors insisted—characterized Eisenhower's decision making after OVERLORD. The original Allied plan called for an invasion of southern France—Operational ANVIL—to follow OVERLORD. ANVIL forces were to open the port of Marseilles, drive up the Rhone valley, and eventually link-up with the armies driving west from Normandy. Churchill, who initially agreed to ANVIL, eventually

opposed it. Better, he argued, to use the forces intended for ANVIL to invade the Balkans. Eisenhower felt that such an operation was not militarily justified. There were few German forces to be destroyed in the Balkans and Allied lines of communication would be long. But he made clear that if political considerations overrode military logic, he would dutifully comply.⁴⁰ Roosevelt—operating from the traditional American approach to war—backed his general rather than the British Prime Minister, so ANVIL proceeded.

Eisenhower followed the same pattern during the final assault on Germany in 1945. After capturing the Ruhr, he planned to move to the remaining German industrial area around Leipzig and Dresden and link-up with the Russians on the Elbe. Churchill begged him to seize Berlin before the Russians did. Eisenhower countered that military factors justified the easiest and shortest link-up with the Russians, but noted that he would change his advance on orders from the two Western heads of state.⁴¹ When Roosevelt did not support Churchill, Eisenhower stuck to his original operational plan.

The second key task in strategic planning is to distinguish necessary and desirable objectives. Eisenhower was consistently clear on this. The clearest example is his February 1942 plan for global strategy.⁴² Since it was impossible at that time to take the strategic offensive against both Germany and Japan, Eisenhower argued that preventing further Japanese expansion was desirable but not necessary for ultimate victory.⁴³ "The principle to be observed in strategic deployment," Eisenhower wrote, "is merely that *minima* should be diverted to secondary or merely desirable objectives while *maxima* are to be striven for in primary, essential, operations."⁴⁴

To distinguish necessary and desirable objectives, Eisenhower continued to rely on military factors. Without realizing it, he persistently struggled with a major dilemma in the American approach to war: forging a military strategy aimed at annihilating enemy forces in a strategic culture with a low tolerance for casualties. This low tolerance nearly prevented the full implementation of a strategy of annihilation by Grant in 1864 and certainly still held in 1944. There were only two

possible solutions. One was to use technology, firepower (especially air and artillery), strategic mobility, and operational maneuver to minimize casualties while destroying the enemy. Sherman and MacArthur were paragons of this method. The second, complementary, solution was reliance on allies to bear part of the blood cost. For the United States in World War II, though, the fact that our primary ally, Britain, had an even lower tolerance for casualties complicated this. The answer was to place great emphasis on keeping the Soviet Union in the war.

As a strategic planner, Eisenhower saw this. In a memorandum to General Marshall and Admiral King, he wrote:

Russia is the great question mark of the war... So long as the Allies regard Germany as their chief opponent and the nation whose defeat provides the speediest path to winning the war, all of our calculations must revolve around the question of what is to be the outcome of the present Russian campaign.

Defeat of the Russian armies would compel a complete reorientation of Allied strategy. It would practically eliminate all opportunity of defeating Germany by direct action and would throw the Allies permanently on the defensive throughout Europe.⁴⁴

Other time-tested axioms of military strategy also helped Eisenhower differentiate necessary and desirable objectives. For example, he understood that when facing multiple enemies, it is better to strike at the weaker first. This might seem to support a "Japan first strategy." After careful analysis, Eisenhower decided the "Germany first" strategy was not at odds with this principle:

It is an axiom that when a divided enemy is encountered, the weaker portion should be attacked and destroyed first. Because, in the absolute sense, the European Axis is stronger in total combat power than is Japan, even with its Navy, the axiom has been cited as an argument for reversing the judgement and calculation of years. This reasoning is without validity. Military estimates are based upon *relative power at a particular point* of actual or possible contact. Because of Japan's geographical position, she is relatively stronger in East Asia, as opposed to the force that can be now brought and maintained against her, than is Germany-Italy in Europe. This is particularly true as long as Russia is in the war.⁴⁵

Eisenhower also followed the old principle of not reinforcing failure. His position on the Philippines in early 1942 showed this. He argued that some effort to bolster American and Filipino resistance must be made for political and psychological reasons, but since it was not possible to decisively alter the outcome of that operation, these should be kept to a minimum.⁴⁶

Furthermore, he avidly sought strategic synchronization. Synchronization takes three forms in warfighting strategy. The first is *geographic*. Just as a tactical commander must coordinate attacks, a strategic commander must assure that activity in different theaters or different areas of operations is synchronized. As a staff planner, Eisenhower suggested that conditions on the Russian front shape the activities of the Western Allies. He wrote, "synchronization of effort will not be possible if Russia is defeated before the U.K. and the U.S. are in a position to act effectively."⁴⁷ This also indicates that Eisenhower understood the relationship of synchronization to risk and strength. Synchronization—like deception, efficiency, surprise, and other elements of a coherent strategy—is a tool to diminish risk. Since strength also diminishes risk, an antagonist who is in a strong position—as the Western Allies were after August 1944—is not as concerned with synchronization.

This same pattern holds during Eisenhower's period as strategic commander. Early in the war, adverse force balances created major risks for the Allies so synchronization was vital. The ANVIL invasion, for example, supported the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, and eastward offensives during Operation TORCH were coordinated with westward thrusts from Egypt. After the Normandy breakout, the force and resource balance shifted dramatically in favor of the Allies so there was little effort to synchronize activity in northern Europe and Italy. This lessened the coherence of Allied strategy but did not create unacceptable levels of risk.

The second form of synchronization involves the *type* of military activity. This was especially true in Europe where resistance and partisan movements were active. "Subversive activities, propaganda, and political warfare," Eisenhower

wrote, "are not only inappropriate, but a positive menace unless carefully and completely coordinated with all military plans and, therefore, must be passed on and approved by the supreme commander."⁴⁸ The central obstacle to synchronization after OVERLORD was the autonomy of American and British strategic air forces. This was not debilitating, however, because there were adequate amounts of tactical air for support of ground operations and because Eisenhower could call on strategic forces when necessary.

The third form synchronizes the *components* of strategy, especially the military and the political. In a democracy, where strategy must mobilize and preserve public support as well as seek victory over the enemy, the marriage of the military and political is complicated. However much he wanted to ignore the internal dimension of strategy, Eisenhower knew he could not. Even his initial plans at the War Department considered domestic morale.⁴⁹ As a staff planner, though, Eisenhower did not have to master this form of synchronization but left it to Marshall and Roosevelt.

Procedural order also characterized Eisenhower's approach to strategy making and operational planning. A strategist in a mature theater has less freedom to configure things like avenues of approach and lines of operation than one in an undeveloped theater. The same holds for strategy making. A commander in a well-developed military organization, unlike a revolutionary strategist, has limited control over the structure through which strategy is developed and implemented. Instead, he inherits an organization and is already socialized into a particular approach to the structure of strategy making. Freed from the burdens of creating an organization from scratch, his task is to maximize the potential of this structure. But as most great military strategists found, an intricate bureaucracy for strategy making can be as much a burden as a boon.

During the first year of American participation in World War II, the finely-honed process of British strategic planning, in comparison to the disorder and ad hoc nature of American efforts, meant:

When American military chieftains met their British counterparts for combined strategic planning through nearly the first half of the war the British could argue for their strategic designs with greater forcefulness than the Americans, simply because they had superior interservice command arrangements and superior organization for the kind of interservice strategic planning that had to underlie a global war.⁵⁰

As a result, London often got its way when the two allies disagreed. Only later did the development of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and growing experience combine to alleviate this problem.

When Eisenhower was Supreme Commander, much of the broad strategy was crafted by the CCS. The long-range planning for the invasion of Europe was done by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) before the OVERLORD invasion. This meant that shaping the post-breakout Allied strategy was more a J-3 (operations) function than a J-5 (strategic plans and policy) one. For Eisenhower, this was certainly no problem. He was perfectly comfortable with the standard staff organization and understood it completely. Moreover, he was also aware of the importance of staff construction in a warfighting situation of unprecedented complexity. In his strategy-making structure, Eisenhower thus sought both *efficiency* and *effectiveness*.

Efficiency was in part a by-product of clear and streamlined organization. To attain it, lines of authority and areas of responsibility had to be clear, and related functions unified. Eisenhower showed a penchant for this sort of efficiency. From the beginning he was plagued by what he considered the chaos and complacency in the War Plans Division. He felt, according to David Eisenhower, that "Allied military planning was in disarray."⁵¹ In the spring of 1942, he played a major role in reorganizing the War Plans Division of the War Department into the Operations Division. As a strategic commander, Eisenhower relied heavily on his staff, and thus took special care in filling key positions.⁵² Even though the OVERLORD plan was a composite effort, the organization of SHAEF was purely Eisenhower's creation.⁵³

The key to efficiency in the structure of Eisenhower's strategy was cooperation among the services and between the two major Western Allies. Even though the United States had relatively little experience with joint military operations, cooperation among the services—"jointness"—was less a problem for Eisenhower than for American strategists in the Pacific. During combat operations in Europe and North Africa, the Navy's role was clearly secondary. It provided transportation of troops and supplies and covering gunfire for initial landings, but the Army led during the bulk of the campaigns. Land warfare, where combined arms operations among infantry, artillery, and cavalry were the rule, made armies at least potentially amenable to cooperation among disparate military organizations. By World War II, of course, the primary jointness issue was between land and air forces.

Cooperation among the Allies—"combined" considerations—demanded greater effort on the part of the Supreme Commander. When Americans and British worked together, the effects of disparate approaches to warfare, disparate institutional cultures, and disparate methods and techniques filtered down to the lowest level. But between the common language of the two Western Allies and the range of shared political and cultural traditions there was an adequate base for cooperation. Still, it took serious and sustained effort on Eisenhower's part to assure efficient cooperation. The foundation was Eisenhower's insistence on an integrated headquarters staff. This began during the planning for Operation TORCH. It was, according to E.K.G. Sixsmith, Eisenhower's "special contribution to the practice of war."⁵⁴ He was adamant about cooperation toward the shared goal and in his opposition to any sense of intra-Allied competition or conflict. Eisenhower replicated the integrated staff structure for OVERLORD.

Effectiveness is simply a strategy-making structure that can get decisions implemented as intended and in a timely fashion. It results from a strong-willed commander supported by his political superiors. The commander must trust subordinates enough to delegate authority and yet, through strength of character and vision, assure that delegated authority

contributes to the overall attainment of objectives. In the joint and combined strategy-making environment which Eisenhower led, unity of command was the central component of structural effectiveness. In fact, Eisenhower considered it an absolute prerequisite in modern war. "[S]tatesmen, generals, admirals, and air marshals—even populations," he wrote, "must develop confidence in the concept of single command and in the leader by which the single command is exercised."⁵⁵

Belief in the need for unity of command is a dimension of strategy where Eisenhower was strongly influenced by George Marshall. Following the ARCADIA conference, Marshall directed Eisenhower to draft a paper establishing unity of command in Southeast Asia.⁵⁶ From this and other papers written while at the War Department, it was clear that Eisenhower considered unity of command not just applicable to the Pacific theater, but a universal principle of joint and combined warfare. In fact, the problems which arose from attempts to unify efforts in the Pacific under a single commander reinforced Eisenhower's belief in this principle.⁵⁷ Marshall agreed. Eisenhower's memos on unity of command were more to provide arguments for use by the Chief of Staff than to convince him.⁵⁸

Finally, Eisenhower excelled in understanding, at least of himself, his superiors, and his subordinates. His sensitivity to the peculiarities of fighting a total war with a coalition of democracies was reflected in his relationship with his superiors. The fact that Churchill and Roosevelt were strong and competent leaders who agreed on the broad contours of Allied strategy and were in frequent contact augmented strategic coherence.⁵⁹ Eisenhower thus did not face the same dilemma as many of his German counterparts who received confusing, impossible, bad, and overly detailed national strategic guidance.

In general, Eisenhower's relationship with Roosevelt was smooth. With a few exceptions such as the launching of Operation TORCH, the President had no desire to make detailed military decisions. George Marshall, who had close ties with both Eisenhower and Roosevelt, assured cooperation

between president and commander. The relationship between the two generals was especially important. They complemented each other and their association eventually became symbiotic. Stephen E. Ambrose writes:

Marshall's strengths were in the higher levels of policy, organization, and strategy. In these areas Eisenhower followed, for he was an operator rather than a theoretician, the perfect man to take Marshall's concepts and translate them into practice. The Supreme Allied Command in Europe would never have come about had it not been for Marshall's thought, driving force, and persuasive powers, but it would not have worked had it not been for Eisenhower.⁶⁰

Roosevelt's deference to Eisenhower on strictly military issues was a good thing. The two had different tolerances for risk. Roosevelt held a consistently higher estimation than Eisenhower of the American people's tolerance for the human and material costs of war. He was, in addition, less patient than Eisenhower and much more a connoisseur of the bold and imaginative. But this dissonance never endangered strategic coherence and probably benefitted the inherently cautious general. As is so often true of coherent strategies, divergent approaches, personalities, and talents among key figures are not debilitating so long as each recognizes his own limitations and the strengths of the others.

Eisenhower's relationship with Churchill was more problematic and more of a threat to the coherence of Allied strategy. While the two men got along very well on a personal level, Eisenhower worried that the Prime Minister was affected too much by the need to justify the peripheral strategy which failed in World War I through the disaster at Gallipoli. Furthermore Churchill—as the descendent of Marlborough and a veteran of a number of wars—considered himself fully capable of making detailed decisions about military operations and strategy. This combination of slightly different approaches to Allied strategy and a willingness to intervene in military decision making on the part of the Prime Minister was a real and persistent threat to strategic coherence.

In handling this challenge, Eisenhower knew that once the American contribution to the war effort surpassed that of the British, Churchill could only impose strategic decisions on the Americans if they bickered and disagreed among themselves. Thus the Supreme Commander gave special care to reaching and preserving consensus within the Eisenhower-Marshall-Roosevelt triumvirate. In addition, Eisenhower's growing personal popularity augmented his power to resist Churchill. As a result, Churchill could insist, beg, cajole, and bluster when he disagreed with Eisenhower's position on issues such as Operation ANVIL, but so long as the American consensus held, Eisenhower prevailed.

The Supreme Commander's relationship with troops was excellent. His ability to motivate them, to cause them to follow his lead willingly rather than by fear, was legendary. In large part this was because Eisenhower genuinely liked and respected his troops and spent as much time as possible with them. In fact, Eisenhower was convinced that top leaders must stay in personal contact with troops and, to an extent, share their danger. "One of the things that gives me the most concern," he wrote during the North Africa campaign, "is the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts."⁶¹

The informal style of leadership worked particularly well for Americans, steeped as they were in an anti-elite culture. (Admittedly, the more European and elitist leadership styles of Patton and MacArthur—when bolstered by boldness and success—also worked with American troops.) Furthermore, Eisenhower continually stressed that the American soldier needed to understand the rationale for the war. He saw Americans as inherently more skeptical of the implorations of political leaders than Europeans, and thus less likely to sublimate their free spirits to a cause which they did not understand. Unlike Patton or MacArthur who led by imposing their will and authority on subordinates and troops, Eisenhower "was patient, clear and logical in his explanations to his officers and men about why things had to be done this way or that."⁶²

In many other ways, Eisenhower recognized the special sort of leadership required in a total war involving open

democracies using citizen armies. In this, at least, Eisenhower was the perfect complement to Churchill. But while the apex of Eisenhower's leadership, unlike that of Churchill, came *after* the point of crisis and prime danger for the Allies rather than at its peak, he was forced to meld together two militaries and two cultures, a task the Prime Minister never faced. "The ability to get people of different nationalities and viewpoints to work together," according to Forest C. Pogue, was Eisenhower's most important trait.⁶³ His accomplishments in this arena are awesome, especially considering that with Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Charles deGaulle, Bernard Montgomery, and George Patton, Eisenhower worked more or less smoothly with some of the most mammoth egos in human history.

Skill at harmonizing diverse and powerful personalities, in fact, propelled Eisenhower to the strategic pinnacle. Ambrose writes:

Eisenhower's emphasis on teamwork, his never-flagging insistence on working together, was the single most important reason for his selection [as commander of OVERLORD], much more important than his generalship, which in truth had been cautious and hesitant.⁶⁴

When first sent to Europe in 1942, Eisenhower knew that his primary function was to rejuvenate morale among the Americans there and control intra-alliance squabbling.⁶⁵ Stress on sustaining high morale in both his staff and his troops dominated Eisenhower's approach to wartime leadership. In fact, he called morale "the greatest single factor in a successful war."⁶⁶ Eisenhower's actions showed evidence of this conviction. According to Harry C. Butcher:

What concerned the Commanding General most was the cultivation of determined enthusiasm and optimism in every member of his staff and every subordinate commander. He refused to tolerate pessimism or defeatism and urged anyone who could not rise above the recognized obstacles to ask for instant release from his theater. He urged the greatest informality in the staff work, put himself at the disposition of his subordinates, but told them they are free to solve their own problems and not get into the habit of passing the buck to him.⁶⁷

However skilled Eisenhower was at selecting staff and subordinate commanders, he was not particularly good at cultivating unrealized talent. Subordinate commanders and staff had to perform or leave. When an officer disappointed him, he immediately asked Marshall for a replacement.⁶⁸ The complexities of modern war, Eisenhower believed, made a commander tremendously reliant on smooth staff work. He wrote:

...the teams and staff through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. The personalities of senior commanders and staff officers are of special importance. Professional military ability and strength of character, always required in high military positions, are often marred by unfortunate characteristics. The two most frequently encountered and hurtful ones being a too obvious avidity for public acclaim and the delusion that strength of purpose demands arrogant and even insufferable deportment.⁶⁹

Finally, strategic coherence in a democracy requires that the strategist understand public attitudes and, when possible, craft strategy in congruence with them. Eisenhower excelled at this. His talent for public relations, according to Ambrose, "set him apart from his two chiefs, MacArthur and Marshall, neither of whom ever established anything like the good relations with the press that Eisenhower did."⁷⁰ The Supreme Commander was relaxed and believable dealing with the media, and thus established an effective rapport. His humility was especially important. This was not simply a natural dimension of Eisenhower's personality, but was a tool used by the Supreme Commander in crafting the proper public image. "[S]ome publicity," he wrote, "is mandatory [for high-level commanders]—otherwise American soldiers would not know they had an American commander, interested in their welfare. The problem is to take it and use it in the amount required by the job; but to avoid distortion and self-glorification."⁷¹ Clearly, Eisenhower saw that public trust of the Supreme Commander provided some insurance against a backlash against a military failure, and thus diminished the inherent risk of his strategic plans.

The dyadic component of strategic coherence was a different matter. Eisenhower did not exhibit any debilitating imbalances like a Hitler or Napoleon, but on all clusters he was skewed, with a definite, patterned set of preferences. In terms of *characteristics*, for example, he was managerial rather than entrepreneurial. The General's attitude toward boldness provides a good illustration. In considering boldness, Clausewitz wrote, "A soldier, whether drummer boy or general, can possess no nobler quality; it is the very metal that gives edge and luster to the sword."⁷² Boldness, like surprise, unsettles the enemy's plans and, by increasing anxiety, diminishes his ability to think and act clearly. More importantly, boldness in a commander is the surest path to seizing and holding the initiative which is, in turn, a prerequisite for victory by an impatient people like the Americans.⁷³

Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower's foremost biographer, argues that the Supreme Commander's campaign in northwest Europe "showed boldness and willingness to take risks."⁷⁴ This is an oversimplification. In strategy, there are two paths to the initiative. One is the unexpected: a strategic commander can create expectations through a consistent pattern of action, and then break his own pattern. Similarly, he can deliberately ignore "rules" of war generally accepted by professionals. Robert E. Lee, for example, seized the tactical initiative at Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville by ignoring the maxim "never divide your force in the face of a superior enemy." (Of course, ignoring maxims can itself become a pattern which the enemy then expects and accommodates. Splitting his forces when in imminent contact with the enemy nearly proved disastrous for Lee at Sharpsburg and did contribute to defeat at Gettysburg.) The second path is grinding, persistent offensive with little surprise or creativity. Grant's 1864-65 campaign, with the exception of the bold initial assault on Petersburg, was characterized by this method.

Eisenhower, as a student of the approach to war fathered by Grant, followed the latter path to the initiative, but certainly not the former. Even Stephen Ambrose, who on most points praises Eisenhower, notes his "indecisiveness and caution on the military front."⁷⁵ After the landing at Normandy, the Allied

Supreme Commander seldom if ever did anything that surprised the Germans. In fact, Eisenhower was often the victim of German boldness such as the counterattacks at Kasserine in 1942 and the Ardennes in 1944. In pre-OVERLORD campaigns, Eisenhower was consistently unable to boldly take advantage of temporary German weakness and thus engineered plodding stalemates in Africa and Italy which were only broken by attrition.⁷⁶

The Supreme Commander was, however, the master of the sort of initiative through persistent offensive pioneered by Grant. While plotting global strategy in 1942 he knew, "We had to attack to win."⁷⁷ As Supreme Commander, he advocated the continual offensive and was willing to accept the costs and risks of such an approach. In defending his strategy prior to the German Ardennes offensive, Eisenhower wrote:

Essentially the German winter offensive was made possible because of my determination to remain on the strategic and tactical offensive from the date we landed on the beaches of Normandy until the German Army should have been beaten to its knees. There were any number of times, and any number of lines at which I could have passed to the defensive, made the entire Allied position absolutely secure and waited for a laborious build-up which would have made cautious advances possible with a minimum of risk, but which would certainly have resulted in a material prolongation of the war...The policy of unrelenting offensive during the fall and winter demanded concentration at the points selected for attack. This inevitably meant taking calculated risks at other places and one of these was the Ardennes region.⁷⁸

All tactical decisions during the breakout and pursuit, Eisenhower argued, involved risk, "but it was my conviction that a flaming offensive, conducted relentlessly and continuously and under conditions where, regardless of enemy reaction, we would always be in a position to take advantage of the situation, was the true course for us to follow."⁷⁹

This showed an astute understanding of the American strategic culture. Our impatience as a people, along with the influence of the public over strategy, means that *political* risk increases steadily during a protracted war. The American people are better able to accept short-term military defeats

(Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Kasserine) than extended conflict. That meant that Eisenhower had to be willing to accept the risks which the strategy of constant offensive entailed in order to shorten the war as much as possible. He understood this and acted accordingly.

In the *style* cluster, Eisenhower was more balanced, with a slight tendency toward the soft. He overcame this tendency with a masterful use of symbiosis, specifically the cultivation of relationships with other individuals who had different but complementary skills. There are many examples including Eisenhower's symbiotic relationships with the broad views and strategic vision of Marshall, the bold and creative Churchill, or the aggressive and brazen Patton. In the day-to-day running of SHAEF, Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, was a perfect counterpoise to the Supreme Commander. Where Eisenhower was friendly, personable, and likeable, Smith "was the kind of manager and hatchet man who had been able to fire without compunction an old friend who had failed."⁸⁰

Eisenhower's reliance on Smith was perfectly coherent. Different people react differently to positive or negative feedback, to persuasion or imposition. No strategic commander can be both tyrant and siren. Yet true effectiveness in management comes from a combination of the hard and the soft, the "good cop" and "bad cop." Eisenhower and Smith—like Eisenhower and MacArthur in earlier times—made such a team, improved the functioning of SHAEF headquarters, and thus augmented the coherence of Allied strategy.

The same was true of Eisenhower's relationship with major subordinate commanders. He and Omar Bradley were close in personality type, but Patton, Montgomery, and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were cut from a different bolt of cloth. Eisenhower recognized the value of Patton's brilliant boldness and used it while assuring that he and Bradley were able to keep it in check.⁸¹ Eisenhower wrote about Patton:

His emotional tenseness and his impulsiveness were the very qualities that made him, in open situations, such a remarkable leader of an army. In pursuit and exploitation there is need for a commander who sees nothing but the necessity of getting ahead: the more he drives his men the more he will save their lives. He must be indifferent to fatigue and ruthless in demanding the last atom of physical energy.⁸²

Again, harmony among dissonant elements led to coherence. Eisenhower's ability to use the diverse personalities of subordinates—Bradley when steadiness was needed and Patton when boldness was required—was masterful.

Montgomery was more difficult. Because the Field Marshal was the senior British officer in the field, Eisenhower could not control him as easily as Patton. Eisenhower and Patton had been friends and colleagues for decades. They shared the traditions and common values generated by the institutional culture of the U.S. Army. This eased communications. Eisenhower and Montgomery, on the other hand, seldom fully understood one another.⁸³ Furthermore, Montgomery's quirks did not have the potential value of Patton's. Where Patton was difficult but imaginative, hard to control but bold, Montgomery was simply difficult and hard to control. In this relationship, then, the dictates of Allied unity diminished strategic coherence despite Eisenhower's best efforts.

In the *driver* cluster, Eisenhower exhibited more imbalance. Internal factors dominated external, often to the detriment of flexibility and initiative. Whether as planner or commander, the Allied buildup, especially of important items such as landing craft, determined the timing of the campaigns rather than the actions of the Germans or Soviet progress on the Eastern Front.

For *focus*, Eisenhower leaned toward the short term. Critics—including Winston Churchill—argued that Eisenhower was too slow in the spring of 1945 to recognize that Germany was defeated and to maneuver his forces so as to best position the West for the coming confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ In fact, Eisenhower carefully considered and rejected a drive on Berlin or into the Balkans.⁸⁵ As Kent Robert Greenfield

noted, the Americans "acted on the assumption that the Soviet Union could take what it wanted in Eastern and Central Europe whether we consented or not."⁸⁶

Mitigators.

Eisenhower inherited rather than created much of his warfighting strategy in World War II. Like all military strategists who are not also makers of national policy, he worked within strict parameters. His role was to take and interpret guidance from national decision makers, draw military objectives from it, and attain, promote, or protect these objectives. For all military decision makers, there is a sliding scale of autonomy. When a military strategist is also a head of state like Napoleon or Hitler, his autonomy is great; the autonomy of a platoon leader is very constrained. Eisenhower's autonomy was greater than that of the German generals and field marshals he confronted, but was limited. At the same time, he also faced larger, more systemic constraints. For example, Eisenhower emerged from a strategic culture steeped in isolationism, unilateralism, and a rationalistic rather than psychological approach to the application of power. The mitigators Eisenhower faced and how he dealt with them profoundly affected the coherence of his strategy.

Perhaps the most pressing type of mitigator was the political. Strategic coherence is always more difficult in a democracy. Many political groups can influence the strategy-making process in some way, and all strategic decisions are tried in the court of public opinion. Because democracy is a political system explicitly designed to ameliorate conflict without violence, it is comparatively inefficient when facing violence. Democracies certainly win wars, but as a rule, do so less efficiently than a nondemocracy in a similar situation. Likewise, coalitions militate coherence, again because of conflicting objectives, but also because of diverse perceptions, philosophies, and tolerance for risk. Since Eisenhower led the military forces of a coalition of democracies, the obstacles to coherence were great indeed.

To amplify the problem, the structure for setting Allied grand strategy was not designed for maximum coherence. Not only were there two coequal heads of state guiding strategy formulation, but both were strong and supremely political. The formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) did add coherence to the strategic guidance that Eisenhower received. He was seldom forced to deal with differences at the level of grand strategy since these were already worked out by the chiefs. During the course of the war, the CCS had 200 formal meetings and, according to Winston Churchill, "considered the whole conduct of the war, and submitted agreed recommendations to the President and me."⁸⁷

The broadest and most enduring obstacle to coherence in Eisenhower's strategy was divergent strategic philosophies or approaches to warfighting on the part of the Western Allies. The Americans believed in:

*a war of mass and concentration...a decisive war leading to the defeat of the enemies' armies. [This] reflected American optimism and confidence in the industrial machine to produce the military hardware and the faith of the military in the ability to raise, equip, train, and lead a large citizen army for offensive purposes.*⁸⁸

Army planners thus felt:

An army strong enough to choose the strategy of annihilation should always choose it, because the most certain and probably the most rapid route to victory lay through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. To destroy the enemy army, the only proven way remained the application of mass and concentration in the manner of U.S. Grant.⁸⁹

This was warfare by attrition—attaining victory by the cumulative destruction of the enemy's material and human assets. "An attritionist," according to current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine, "sees the enemy as targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically. Thus, the focus is on efficiency, leading to a methodical, almost scientific approach to war. With the emphasis on the efficient application of massed, accurate fires, movement tends to be ponderous and tempo relatively unimportant."⁹⁰ This sort of attrition warfare would be

reflected in Eisenhower's direct and aggressive warfighting strategy.

British strategic culture, by contrast, favored the indirect approach to victory. J.M.A. Gwyer described it as a "more supple type of strategy, which seeks to gain its ends by the skillful employment of limited means..."⁹¹ In contrast to American tradition, the British relied more heavily on psychological skill, surprise, deception, and the gradual wearing down of the enemy's will to resist. In this sense, the British approach was steeped more in Sun Tzu than in Clausewitz.⁹² Facing the Third Reich, British grand strategists decided that:

The enemy had to be contained, his economy strained and starved by blockade, his resources and population worn down by air bombardment, and only when his morale was on the point of collapse would a direct blow be struck at his armies. It was an offensive strategy of a kind if not the offensive quite as the Americans understood it.⁹³

These differing approaches to war are easy to understand. Britain, given its relatively small population, geographic isolation, commercialism, and control of the sea, historically practiced something like the indirect approach in national security strategy. In seeking to prevent any single power from dominating the European continent, Britain used commercial power to subsidize continental allies, sea power to blockade potential continental hegemony and force them to disperse their strength, and land power when necessary and potentially decisive.⁹⁴ The indirect approach called for avoiding the heart of a land power's strength and instead attacking weak areas such as Napoleon's Iberian empire and Imperial Germany's Turkish ally. When combat was necessary, *maneuver* was the byword. Fighting was, as Richard E. Simpkin puts it, "only one way of applying military force to the attainment of a politico-economic aim—and a rather inelegant last resort at that."⁹⁵

British strategy in World War I was an interregnum, a bloody detour into the realm of attrition strategy. Its economic and human cost renewed the preference for the indirect approach.

Strategic *tradition* was elevated to canon: support for the indirect approach, for flexibility, and imagination, verged on the religious. Churchill, for example, wrote:

Nearly all battles which are regarded as masterpieces of the military art, from which have been derived the foundation of states and the fame of commanders, have been battles or manoeuvre in which the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.³⁶

B.H. Liddell Hart, the doyen of British strategic theorists, pushed the argument even further. He considered the indirect approach "a law of life in all spheres: a truth of philosophy."³⁷ As much as any single factor, the desire to avoid another Somme, Ypres, or Passchendaele drove British decision making in World War II. The Americans, though bloodied by the use of direct strategies in 1918 and in Grant's 1864-65 campaign, had won their major wars without unbearable losses. Thus strategic dissonance between the Allies was rooted in their histories. Eisenhower could not change this, but recognized the need to keep it from becoming debilitating.

There were some shared features of British and American strategic culture for him to work with. But there were also distinctions. For the Americans, impatience (which is a cornerstone of American culture in general), a massive industrial and technological base and a larger manpower pool led to a modified attritional approach to warfare. This substituted firepower for bloodshed when possible, but—given American impatience—accepted large-scale casualties when necessary to procure victory before public support ran out. Thus the British approach accorded low casualties a higher priority than quick victory, while the American approach reversed the two.

The British and Americans were also divided by a fundamental difference in the way they understood the relationship of the enemy's armed forces and national will. For the Americans, the enemy's armed forces were the direct route

to the heart of national will. If they were destroyed, will collapsed. For the British, the enemy's armed forces were more a *reflection* of the state of national will. Since destroying opposing armies, navies, and air forces was the most costly way to erode the enemy's national will, cheaper techniques such as economic blockade and strategic bombing were preferred. When a blood cost could not be avoided, better it was paid by allies, whether Soviets or French Resistance, than by British forces. (Once the need for direct engagement was clear, though, the British never shirked whether at Waterloo or Normandy.)

Understanding the Allies' diverse strategic cultures was relatively simple; reconciling them—as Eisenhower had to do—was not. Preserving alliance comity and unity of command thus became an obsession of the Supreme Commander and one of his most pressing problems. For the Western Allies, there were three primary obstacles to unity of command. The first was the British tradition of giving broad powers and autonomy to the separate component commanders. While not as loose as the Japanese system where joint operations were literally negotiated on an ad hoc basis between army and navy commanders, the British did favor command by committee rather than unity of command. Throughout the war, the Americans and Eisenhower in particular pressed for unity of command, while the British advocated a greater devolution of authority to component commanders. For example, at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the British re-proposed the committee system for the invasion of Sicily, and after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, Montgomery repeatedly asked to be named the single ground commander with far-reaching power.⁹⁸ Eisenhower resisted all such pleas.

The second obstacle was the autonomy of the British and American strategic air forces in England, particularly in the period preceding OVERLORD. In preparation for the cross-channel invasion, Eisenhower wanted to use the strategic air forces to destroy the French and Belgian railroad network, and thus complicate or prevent German attempts to reinforce and resupply forces in Normandy. This became

known as the "transportation plan" and was strongly supported by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Eisenhower's air component commander, and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower's deputy commander.⁹⁹

Strategic bomber commanders including British Air Chief Marshall Arthur Harris and Americans General Carl Spaatz and Major General James H. Doolittle resisted.¹⁰⁰ The transportation plan, they felt, would bleed resources away from attempts to cripple German fighter production and thus endanger the winning of air superiority which was absolutely vital for the success of OVERLORD. Furthermore, they still believed that the strategic bomber offensive was on the verge of forcing a German collapse, and thus a cross-channel invasion was not necessary.¹⁰¹ Using strategic bombing forces operationally, as Eisenhower wanted, would, according to the air strategists, make the war longer and bloodier. Again Eisenhower was adamant. Eventually a compromise was reached by which the strategic bomber commanders would strike operational level targets in France, but would be under the direct command of Eisenhower and report to Tedder, rather than to Leigh-Mallory, the tactical air component commander.

The third obstacle was Montgomery. Although he was under the direct command of Eisenhower, Montgomery was also the senior British commander in theater, and thus had direct ties to Churchill. On a number of occasions he used this to attempt to enlist the Prime Minister's help in forcing Eisenhower to change his mind on issues like support for the narrow thrust or the appointment of a single ground commander separate from the Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower's conflict with Montgomery, as much as any single issue, showed how coalition politics can mitigate structural coherence. And despite Eisenhower's frequent paeans to unity of command, allied cooperation—unity of effort—was clearly more important. Military thinkers often treat unity of *effort* and unity of *command* as synonymous or at least as dimensions of the same phenomenon.¹⁰² In reality, they are not. For Eisenhower, in fact, the two were sometimes in direct conflict. When this occurred, Eisenhower leaned toward coalition amity at the expense of the boldness and clarity which

derive from strong centralized control and command. Again, coherence was a series of delicate balances. And again, Eisenhower's strategy was not markedly imbalanced, but clearly tilted toward the conservative and cautious.

Assessment.

As a product of the American strategic tradition, Eisenhower was imminently comfortable with the direct, linear, materialistic mode of warfare mastered by Grant. He was thus strong in the linear component of strategic coherence with special emphasis on synchronization, clarity, and morale—all factors whose importance was increased by the complexity of large-scale coalition warfare involving democracies. The Supreme Commander understood that the focus of effort in crafting strategic coherence varied according to the type of conflict faced.

Eisenhower also had an astute understanding of the role of the individual strategic leader in the modern era. Unlike a Napoleon or Hitler who longed for the days when a single heroic leader could arrogate all key decisions to himself, Eisenhower recognized that modern warfare required more leadership characteristics and capabilities than any one individual could possibly have. He thus delegated authority skillfully and sought symbiotic relationships with other leaders whose skills complemented his own.

On the negative side, Eisenhower was cautious, sometimes to the point of debility. To some extent, this can be explained by his reading of strategic trends. He knew that time was on the side of the Allies. As the United States mobilized its industry and manpower, the balance would increasingly favor the Allies. There was, therefore, no rush to complete the defeat of Nazi Germany. But there were other factors. One was probably a lack of confidence in untested American troops and leaders, especially in the North Africa campaign.

Eisenhower's desire to minimize Allied casualties also generated caution, but in this case, Montgomery and Patton's warnings that boldness would, in the long term, lessen the blood cost of the war by bringing it to a more rapid conclusion

were probably correct. Personality factors, then, kept Eisenhower from seeking the bold, the shocking, or the surprising move. He found an operational pattern that worked—albeit at a cost—and ploddingly kept to it. This prevented him from fully exploiting opportunities, especially those that existed when German resistance temporarily collapsed after the breakout from Normandy.

The key question is: Did Eisenhower maximize strategic coherence given the mitigators? The answer is: Almost. With all other elements of his approach to strategy held constant but his aversion to boldness altered slightly, it is possible that the war could have been shortened with Allied political objectives still attained. But because Eisenhower attained these objectives at an acceptable cost, he did little critical examination of his approach to strategy, but rather counted it as a success and as a model for emulation during later periods of strategic leadership.

CHAPTER 3

DETERRENCE

Introduction.

During the second phase of Eisenhower's career as a strategist he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). Since he held both of these positions during peacetime, the strategies he helped construct were designed for deterrence rather than warfighting. His general approach was to translate what had *worked during wartime into deterrent strategy*, a technique that brought both successes and shortcomings.

The threat to national security is never as clear in peacetime as during war. This rather obvious fact carries far-reaching implications. It means, for instance, that the guardians of national security must develop broad strategic constructs in an amorphous and ambiguous context. To someone like Eisenhower who sought and thrived on clarity, this was difficult. As a deterrent strategist he longed constantly for such clarity. "I personally believe," he wrote to Bedell Smith, "that it is not only vital that we decide upon the general plan we must follow but that we determine also the areas in which we can concentrate most advantageously."¹⁰³ Unfortunately, longing can cloud reality, and Eisenhower often flirted with the dangerous oversimplification which arises when the inherently complex is treated as if it were simple.

In addition, the peacetime strategist faces many more constraints on his autonomy than either the warfighting or grand strategist. The power that accrues to a warfighter due to danger or to a grand strategist due to political authority is dispersed. Horizontal leadership—the ability to motivate, move, and convince coequals—rises in importance compared

to command in the pure sense. Eisenhower noted "Leadership is as vital in conference as it is in battle."¹⁰⁴ He might also have added that it is leadership of a different type, requiring a different set of skills.

At the same time, peacetime strategy, with its more amorphous threat, offers opportunities for the exercise of creativity. The actions of the enemy in war are dictatorial, rigidly drawing the boundaries of the rational and the feasible. In conflict short of war where risk is lessened or, at least, cloudier, more is possible. But peacetime strategy also demands greater skill in the dyadic realm of strategic coherence. The deterrent strategist must create and nurture dynamic balances. He must craft strength without intimidation and popular support without fervor. Peacetime strategy is also more inward-looking as morale and organization take on greater importance. Given all this, both opportunities and pitfalls abound.

For the military strategist trained as a warfighter, deterrence can be frustrating. The psychological aspects outweigh the physical as the goal is to create beliefs, images, and perceptions in the minds of enemies and allies rather than to seize, hold, or destroy. New demands are placed on the strategist—to understand the intricacies of alien cultures and to manipulate the arcane link between physical actions and mental images through the prism of this culture. Although hampered by an insular upbringing and education that gave him little contact with foreign mindsets, Eisenhower proved an astute enough psychologist to meet with moderate success as a deterrent strategist.

Context.

In contrast to World War II, Eisenhower did not inherit a prefabricated strategic plan to be fleshed-out and translated into operational plans. Instead he found a grand strategic *tabula rasa* where he was a secondary actor. Only gradually did the vague strategic concepts of 1945 give birth to a coherent grand strategy. For Eisenhower, this ongoing development of American grand strategy was helpful but did

not, at first, free him from the complications which arise when attempting to build a military strategy on a weak and amorphous grand strategic foundation.

At the end of World War II, the United States combined immense power with inexperience and uncertainty about the appropriate exercise of this power. From strategic immaturity arose hesitancy and, at times, a debilitating nostalgia. This was easily understood. Not only did the United States have to shake off its lingering isolationism, but it was also forced to assume global leadership during one of the most trying times in human history. The war had truly signalled the destruction of the old international system. Even more importantly, it had unleashed forces which challenged and, in some cases, destroyed the *internal* social, economic, and political systems of states. The world was inundated with simmering, sometimes exploding discontent and rapid change. And all of this, it seemed, was made worse by the activities of a wounded but still-dangerous Soviet Union.

The American grand strategy which emerged, of course, was containment.¹⁰⁵ Put simply, we jettisoned isolationism and exercised leadership in all elements of national power to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and communism, first in Europe, and later in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. What remained for strategic planners—including Eisenhower—was to make containment operational.

One of the key tasks in this process was to define the role of military power within American grand strategy. The initial hope of the architects of post war grand strategy was that military power would have little utility. When it was used, it was to be in pursuit of collective security under the aegis of the United Nations. But the beginning of the cold war and the emergence of a hostile Soviet Union which had not, in American eyes, demobilized after the defeat of the Nazis, altered any conclusions about the disutility of military power. What the United States needed, then, was a military strategy that would support the new grand strategy. As Chief of Staff and SACEUR, Eisenhower attempted to fulfill this need.

Coherence.

The basis of any coherent strategy is a clear and equally coherent conceptual framework. For Eisenhower's warfighting strategy, this combined Allied grand strategy was designed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and their lieutenants with the traditional American approach to war pioneered by Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Peacetime deterrent strategy required a somewhat different framework. To construct this, Eisenhower began with an assessment of the postwar global security environment. He concluded that the world was "in a rather sorry mess..."¹⁰⁶ All the optimism spawned by the defeat of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese imperialism and the rise of new international institutions like the United Nations quickly evaporated. Reasons included the damage from the war, the collapse of the old international order, widespread malaise, rapid change within nations, and, most of all, the machinations and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. The pervasive attitude in the West went from euphoria to despair—not a fertile ground for a steady and resolute strategy.

Immediately after the war, hope of continued Allied cooperation lingered so, Eisenhower noted, it was forbidden to refer to the Soviets as enemies during budget requests before Congress.¹⁰⁷ Even as relations between Washington and Moscow soured, Eisenhower's view of the Soviets, based on his experience with wartime cooperation, was rather benign when compared to Truman and his top foreign policymakers. Without gauging intentions, Eisenhower the military planner was convinced that the damage suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II would keep Moscow from launching a war for some time.¹⁰⁸ He thus concluded that much of the anxiety in the West was overblown.

By 1947, Eisenhower's attitude toward the Soviets hardened. He saw Moscow as aggressive, but not in the suicidal fashion of the Nazis. It was, instead, a more subtle aggression stressing political manipulation, subterfuge, intimidation, and propaganda. This had serious implications for the importance of military power in American grand strategy. Taking a position somewhat less bellicose than

Truman's. Eisenhower believed that Moscow was not preparing for war, and thus a political resolution of the cold war was at least possible.¹⁰⁹

Like George Kennan, the intellectual architect of containment, Eisenhower felt that the Soviets combined great strength with great weakness. They did retain a massive army and could count on communists, fellow-travellers, and front organizations worldwide, but at the same time, the Soviet system was fragile because "it suppresses the natural and decent aspirations of men."¹¹⁰ And again like Kennan, Eisenhower was convinced that the nature of the Soviet system meant that only counter-power could deter Moscow's attempt at world domination. He wrote:

The Communists have clearly proved that in the international field they respect no law but force. The free world has no choice but to develop a volume of force that will prevent even the misguided Communists from putting their case to the test of arms.¹¹¹

What was needed was active U.S. engagement around the globe to engineer and orchestrate anti-Communist coalitions. Eisenhower was an early and persistent advocate of this, arguing the United States must "assert the full influence deriving from our financial, economic, political and military power..."¹¹² Even more than simple engagement, it was mandatory that the United States exercise leadership of the non-Communist world. In a letter to Edward Hazlett, Jr., Eisenhower wrote:

...American leadership must be exerted every minute of the day, every day, to make sure that we are securing from these combined countries their maximum of accomplishment. Where any nation fails—as some of them are, of course, partially failing now—we must take a certain portion of the responsibility by admitting that in that particular instance, our leadership has been partially ineffective.¹¹³

Geostrategically, Eisenhower was convinced that the security and freedom of Europe were the primary U.S. national security objectives, and thus required the most serious and sustained attention. In fact, the outcome of the cold war in Europe would largely determine its course on the global stage.

"[T]here is an inescapable relationship between attainment of NATO objectives," Eisenhower wrote to Averell Harriman, "and the numerous aggressions and activities of the Communists in many fronts throughout the world."¹¹⁴ In the long term, though, Eisenhower thought direct American predominance should be limited. The goal was a short period where U.S. assistance would rejuvenate the spirit, economies, and militaries of the non-Communist world. In 1951, Eisenhower argued the United States should "strive for a very intensive but relatively short program of American assistance which should begin to pass its peak, especially in ground force content, within two and one-half or three years."¹¹⁵

The limited nature of intensive American involvement in Europe was an enduring theme of Eisenhower's view of the global security environment. He wrote:

Europe must, as a whole, provide in the long run for its own defense. The United States can move in and, by its psychological, intellectual, and material leadership, help to produce arms, units, and the confidence that will allow Europe to solve its problem. In the long run it is not possible—and most certainly not desirable—that Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the fashion that Rome's territories vainly sought security many hundred years ago.¹¹⁶

Eventually, then, "each country must provide the heart and soul of its own defense."¹¹⁷ There was no acceptable alternative, Eisenhower believed, to collective security.¹¹⁸

By the end of the 1940s, Eisenhower had developed a clearer notion of the fundamental nature of the cold war, and came to view it as a manichaeian clash of fundamentally incompatible ideas, not simply a tragic series of misunderstandings among old allies. Under such conditions, victory rather than accommodation was the goal. This line of thought was important to Eisenhower's maturation as a strategist. True strategic coherence must reflect a deeper and broader understanding of the meaning, purpose, and role of conflict in a given age. Eisenhower was slowly moving toward this state.

"The theory of defense against aggressive threat," he wrote, "must comprehend more than simple self-preservation: the security of spiritual and cultural values, including national and individual freedom, human rights and the history of our nation and our civilization are included."¹¹⁹ The cold war, to phrase it differently, was a total struggle waged simultaneously in all dimensions of human conflict. This was a pregnant notion implying that "national defense is not the exclusive property and concern of men in uniform, but the responsibility as well of labor, management, agriculture, industry and every group that goes to make up the national complex."¹²⁰ And, since the cold war was an ideological struggle, American and Western strategy had to be holistic, weaving together ideological, psychological, political, and economic responses. To Forrestal, Eisenhower wrote: "...it is almost impossible to deal with the security problem without giving consideration to vital factors involving the political, industrial, economic and even moral fibre of the United States."¹²¹

While Eisenhower found this holistic view of strategy necessary in the face of the Soviet threat, he also found it troubling. The general was very much a product of American strategic and military culture which stresses the divisions and boundaries between the exercise of military power and other forms of national strength. Holism in strategy ran counter to the "purist" view of military-civil relations which sought to exclude the military from nonmilitary strategic issues. Eisenhower, by inclination, favored the purist approach. For example, when the immensely popular general was asked to join the Foreign Policy Association, a nonpartisan educational organization, he declined and explained:

While of course the Army is an instrument of foreign policy, it is merely an instrument. So while as a citizen I applaud every effort to inform ourselves and others of the essentials of international problems, as military head of the Army, I feel it is my duty to remain mute.¹²²

MacArthur's experience as the occupation ruler of Japan heightened Eisenhower's distrust of military impingement on what he considered civilian prerogatives.¹²³ Still, he gradually moved toward a "fusionist" position that viewed military power

as inseparable from other forms of power and thus accorded military leaders a major role in the shaping of grand strategy.

This was particularly clear in the economic realm. Throughout the early years of the cold war, Eisenhower was developing the keen feel for the role of economics in grand strategy which would be a trademark of his presidency. He was especially aware of the relationship of economic health to national morale which, in turn, undergirded all other elements of national power. "European economic health and morale," he wrote, "are both essential ingredients to the security of the region."¹²⁴

Such thinking illustrated a sophisticated understanding of American strategic culture and the strategic situation. Military power, Eisenhower argued, "is largely negative in character. Its purpose is to protect or defend, not to create and develop."¹²⁵ Yet military force was "still too much respected" in the new global security environment to be ignored.¹²⁶ Eisenhower thus subscribed to the traditional American notion that military power should be accumulated only reluctantly, but when necessary, should be gathered in impressive amounts.

Finally, as the basis for his approach to military strategy, Eisenhower gave serious thought to the role of war and military power in the new global security environment. He anticipated no revolutionary change in the nature of warfare.¹²⁷ It would remain an unfortunate currency of international relations so long as dictators existed. Drawing on what he saw as the lessons of World War II, he considered unity of command, a strong peacetime military, and cooperation with allies as the primary imperatives for post-war military strategy.¹²⁸

Eisenhower also concluded that the trend toward greater and more all-encompassing scope in warfare would continue. "Should the tragedy of another war occur," he wrote, "the sweep of combat will be over broader and deeper areas. Thus the zone of battle, in its three dimensions, will tend to expand, and every element contributing directly to the conduct or support of military operations will become a target for enemy action."¹²⁹ But despite this physical expansion of combat, the incendiary nature of the global security environment meant that

there would be a temporal compression of war. It could, in other words, come with shocking suddenness rather than as the conclusion of a prefatory crisis. Eisenhower argued:

Conditions today are sufficiently turbulent...that war might be visited upon the world without the impetus of planning or deliberate policy. One isolated action might precipitate conflict and, once started in a critical area, war leaps across new borders and quickly involves other nations whose whole desire is for peace.¹³⁰

Because of the vital and destructive role of airpower in future wars, enemy air forces and weapons of mass destruction would be first priority military objectives. All friendly resources—air, land, sea, and psychological—would be used to attack these. Conventional forces would be “lighter, faster and harder hitting,” but these same qualities would increase logistics requirements.¹³¹ Armor would form the centerpiece to conventional operations, thus creating a need for decentralized command to allow for initiative by individual divisions; relatively light and easily maintained vehicles with heavy firepower; and close cooperation with tactical air forces.¹³²

Unlike World War II in Europe, the United States was likely to be a target at the onset of the conflict.¹³³ This meant that the nation needed an adequate standing military force and overseas bases. The new U.S. military strategy to use these forces should, according to Eisenhower, be shaped by a set of assumptions about future military conflict:¹³⁴

- The next major war would require complete national mobilization.
- The United States will be attacked without a declaration of war by a prepared enemy using airpower, “new weapons,” and sabotage.
- The United States cannot depend on protection by Allies during mobilization as in World War II.
- The British Empire would be at least a friendly neutral during the war.
- The United States should seek to confine combat to theaters outside North America.

- No nation or foreseeable coalition could successfully invade the continental United States during the 1940s.
- The United States may be drawn into a war as a third party at any time.

Despite the importance of airpower in future war, Eisenhower—in a stance not particularly surprising for the Army Chief of Staff—argued for the continuing relevance of ground forces. To Joseph L. Collins he wrote:

There has been much talk of air and sea winning a war, etc.—I honestly believe that, if we view the future with naked eyes, and reject all wishful thinking, we will find that the training, indoctrination, conditioning, equipping, and readying of our ground forces is possibly going to be an even more important thing in any future war than in the past.¹³⁵

Only ground forces, after all, could seize and hold bases for retaliation and air defense. Still, Eisenhower realized that the traditional autonomy of ground forces had passed. “The ground soldier,” he wrote, “is now only one member of the team.”¹³⁶ “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in a war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”¹³⁷

The most important distinction between peacetime and wartime strategy—and one which Eisenhower recognized—was the definition of the primary objective. In peacetime, military power was used to deter enemies rather than defeat them. Even given this different objective, Eisenhower believed that the key themes of warfighting strategy, especially *efficiency* and *morale*, also held for deterrent strategy. These were the cornerstones of the deterrent strategy he attempted to craft.

Eisenhower became Army Chief of Staff in late 1945. As with his assignment to the War Department at the beginning of World War II, he approached the new position warily. He wrote:

No personal enthusiasm marked my promotion to Chief of Staff, the highest military post a professional soldier in the United States

Army can reach. When President Truman broached the subject I told him that I'd much rather retire but he said he had special need of me at the moment.¹³⁸

There were a number of reasons for this attitude. "The job ahead," he wrote, "was not pleasant. The demobilization of a wartime army is a dreary business... The high morale that characterizes the healthy unit in campaigns deteriorates as the time nears for its dispersal."¹³⁹ Furthermore, the power of a wartime commander grows slippery during the political battles faced by a peacetime leader. As Louis Galambos wrote, the Chief of Staff "confronted situations that were more complex and far less malleable than his administrative environment had been during the war and the occupation."¹⁴⁰ This was all made even more frustrating by the fact that Truman did not consult his Chief of Staff to nearly the extent that Roosevelt did with Marshall.¹⁴¹

Still, duty called, so Eisenhower set out to shape the peacetime Army and peacetime military strategy as best he could. Three tasks in particular demanded most of his attention: 1) defining the role of the Army and of ground forces in general in the new national security and military strategy; 2) preserving the effectiveness of the Army during extensive and rapid demobilization; and 3) clarifying the role of nuclear weapons in the new military strategy.

Eisenhower's thinking on the nature of future war provided a conceptual foundation for the role of ground forces in the new military strategy. As noted earlier, he considered ground forces vital even in an era when the strategic projection of air and naval power took on added importance. But there were a number of obstacles to the development of effective U.S. ground forces. Congress cut every budget submission presented by the Army before the war in Korea.¹⁴² The technological element and speed of modern warfare, in addition, placed great demands on individual soldiers. Armies could not be raised overnight, but required extensive training. Eisenhower thus supported the notion of universal military training which received serious consideration during the early years of the cold war.¹⁴³ He wrote:

Developments of modern warfare tend to emphasize the necessity for more and more technical knowledge for an ever-increasing number of men. This requires intensive and extensive training in the use of elaborate and expensive equipment. In addition, we are seeking to prepare armies as well as individuals. This necessitates "team" training in maneuvers with adequate time, machines, terrain, and personnel.¹⁴⁴

In any conventional war, Eisenhower saw the short-term military goals as defending the United States against direct attack, striking an immediate retaliatory blow against enemy bases and sources of power, and containing enemy main forces while mobilizing.¹⁴⁵ These objectives—in combination with the strategic lessons of World War II—created a need for the "timely mobilization of public opinion, trained men, proven weapons and essential industries."¹⁴⁶

As Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower could support the sustainment of the technological and industrial base, but only as a secondary actor. Manpower was another matter. When support for universal military training faltered, Eisenhower became a strong advocate of a large and well-trained reserve. For Army force structure, then, he argued:

[T]he professional Army must be a highly mobile striking force, backed by organized civilian components which can immediately assume the defensive positions vacated by the Regular Army and reinforce the latter in large-scale offensive operations.¹⁴⁷

Eisenhower had only limited control over the pace or extent of demobilization. At the conclusion of the war, the public brought tremendous pressure on the Truman Administration to complete this as rapidly as possible. What Eisenhower did have to do was to preserve some modicum of order in the rush toward demobilization and to attempt to retain an effective force.

In many ways the formation of national policy on the use of nuclear weapons was the thorniest issue in American military strategy during the first years of the cold war. Eisenhower thought about this problem within the context of his view of future war, but did not develop a clear notion of the precise role of the atomic bomb. He was convinced that nuclear weapons

did not signal a true revolution in warfare.¹⁴⁸ They did not make conventional forces obsolete and, Eisenhower believed, they should be incorporated into American military strategy.¹⁴⁹ The Chief of Staff did argue that the difficulty of defending against nuclear attacks once they were launched make rapid and early strikes against enemy bases the top priority at the inception of war.¹⁵⁰ He did not, however, consider that this could easily imply that *preemptive attacks*, which were antithetical to the American tradition in war, should become part of our strategy. It was only during Eisenhower's presidency that he wrestled with this dilemma.

In general, Eisenhower cannot be faulted too much for his failure to fully come to grips with the strategic implications of the nuclear age. Since he was not a close confidant of Truman, he had little direct input into the formulation of the highest levels of American strategy including its atomic element.¹⁵¹ And furthermore, none of Eisenhower's contemporaries had a markedly more sophisticated understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons during the 1940s. Only by the end of the decade did the country's best strategic minds began to explore the full strategic implications of the nuclear age.¹⁵²

Throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff, Eisenhower persistently sought efficiency in the use of national resources for security purposes. *Frugality and concentration* formed the coda to all strategic decisions. In a memorandum to key staff officers soon after becoming Chief, Eisenhower wrote:

The days of spending a hundred million dollars instead of accepting any delay are gone. That was necessary in war—now the watchword must be economy in men and money. I should like to see us in all our activities everywhere showing a concern for the tax payer's dollar before we are hounded into it by Congressional committees, by articles in the press, and so on.¹⁵³

And to his close confidant Bedell Smith, Eisenhower wrote: "There is very obviously a definite limit to our resources. Concentration is indicated just as it is in war."¹⁵⁴

Another way to maximize efficiency was through closer cooperation among the military services—"jointness." "The armed teamwork that achieved combat victory in World War

II," Eisenhower wrote, "becomes more important as time passes. The only way to assure its growth is through joint operational plans made now and continually adjusted..."¹⁵⁵ This demanded constant attention. During the war, Eisenhower's position as Supreme Commander gave him the power to forcibly insure interservice cooperation when required. In peacetime, there was no equivalent since the first few secretaries of Defense had neither the power nor the inclination to rein in the service chiefs. Even the decision to create a Chairman of the JCS in 1949 (after Eisenhower's tenure as Army Chief of Staff) did not solve the problem. And the shrinking military budgets of the 1940s heightened service parochialism and turf battles.¹⁵⁶

Eisenhower, as Army Chief of Staff, had no authority over those who opposed greater jointness, especially the Navy.¹⁵⁷ All he could do was to use his powers of persuasion and personal prestige to cajole opponents and encourage greater interservice cooperation. He gave special focus to the relationship of land and air forces. Eisenhower was an advocate of the creation of a separate air force, but continued to support the development of joint land/air doctrine and the evolution of techniques for close air support.¹⁵⁸

Eisenhower saw preservation of American industrial, technological, and scientific advantages as another key to efficiency, although again, his role in this arena was more that of cheerleader than direct participant. He did move the Army toward closer cooperation with the civilian industrial, technological, and scientific sectors. In World War II, according to Eisenhower,

the military effort required for victory threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many of which were effectively discharged only through the invaluable assistance supplied by our cumulative resources in the natural and social sciences and the talents and experience furnished by management and labor. The armed forces could not have won the war alone.¹⁵⁹

Presumably this would also hold for future war, not only during mobilization for a sustained conflict but also during the

initial stages when America's forces would need technological superiority to offset numerical inferiority.

Along with efficiency, morale was the other enduring theme of Eisenhower's time as Chief of Staff. But he did feel that public motivation and morale were less his job than when, as Supreme Commander, he held the attention of the world. This was only realistic: public support for U.S. military strategy was largely the purview of the Administration. But even though public support was beyond his control, Eisenhower was sensitive to the effect that it had on his ability to complete key tasks. This was especially true of the timing of various functions. Given this, he felt that the restructuring of the Army and the building of a new military strategy could be completed "before we become paralyzed by that public apathy which seems inevitable in times of relative peace."⁶⁰ As during war, then, Eisenhower was aware that public support for American strategy was both vital and fickle, with changes coming in a tidal rather than linear fashion.

There were other elements of morale over which the Chief of Staff had more control. Eisenhower continued to believe that American soldiers, whether regular Army or reserves, required sustained and rational motivation to perform properly. It was the job of top military leaders, especially the Chief of Staff, to explain the stakes and rationale for the cold war and thus provide motivation.⁶¹ His personal style was amenable to this task.

In January 1951, Eisenhower began his assignment as SACEUR with a tour of Europe. He used this to publicize some of his central themes—in a Europe-wide radio broadcast, the new SACEUR announced that he brought no troops with him, but did bring hope.⁶² Despite this necessary public optimism, Eisenhower was not enthusiastic about becoming military leader of the Alliance, assuming that the job would be "confining, onerous and devoid of the excitement that prevails in a command headquarters in time of an emergency."⁶³ But as with all of his time as a strategist, duty prevailed.

It might have seemed that Eisenhower would welcome the return to Europe, scene of his greatest glory. Any such feelings

were tarnished by the difficulty of the task he faced. He knew that "peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient."¹⁶⁴ Given the *leitmotif* of his approach to strategy—military efficiency maximized by minimum of political constraints—a consummately political organization like NATO would prove a challenge, perhaps an insurmountable one. Most frustrating of all was the fact that as the Alliance's military leader, Eisenhower had only limited effect on the vital political component. He wrote:

SHAPE is a military headquarters, but one whose successful functioning is entirely dependent upon political progress within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It stands or falls with the effectiveness of NATO leaders in uniting the people of the free world in a clear understanding of the perils facing us, and upon the degree of success achieved in uniting the potential power of the various participating countries. To produce such unity in NATO seems to me to be our first and transcendent purpose—so much that it requires the highest priority in the thought and resources of every member nation.¹⁶⁵

Despite the frustrations, Eisenhower understood the importance of his position, especially his ability to use his personal prestige to establish the psychological foundation of a coherent alliance strategy. He immediately set out to sell NATO in both the United States and Europe through an endless series of press conferences, trips and meetings; to encourage Europeans to make a greater effort for their own defense and augment international cooperation; and to counter Americans who argued that nuclear superiority obviated the need for enlarged conventional forces.¹⁶⁶ As he did this, the new Supreme Commander continued to stress efficiency and morale.

In a general sense, there are at least four forms of strategic efficiency. One is systemic. Much like the "total quality management" which is popular among corporations and is becoming increasingly so in the contemporary military, this stresses streamlining, limiting redundancy, and synchronization among the various components of large, complex organizations. The second is attitudinal, and causes frugality and cooperation to become ingrained characteristics

of the individuals who make up a large, complex organization. The third is skill maximizing: efficiency is heightened when the individuals who compose an organization are talented and well-trained. The fourth form is peculiar to strategy. Because strategy involves the imposition of power and conflict between two (or more) thinking, scheming antagonists, efficiency is increased by surprising, unsettling, and confusing the enemy at key junctures. Thus initiative, boldness, and creativity—when properly used—heighten efficiency.

As SACEUR, Eisenhower excelled in the first three forms of efficiency, while falling short on the fourth. Although his influence over the development of American military strategy was less than when Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower continued to encourage "a common and joint approach to the problems that now face us."⁶⁷ Similarly, unity of command remained an intrinsic element of his approach to strategy, especially in his role as commander of U.S. forces—CINCEUCOM. For example, when asked for comments on emergency war plan IRONBARK, Eisenhower wrote:

[I]t must be made absolutely clear that the directive of the President placing all US forces in Europe under my operational command for the accomplishment of my mission, has no qualifications or limitations other than the responsibility to ensure the evacuation of US civilians in the event of an emergency.⁶⁸

Finally, Eisenhower the deterrent strategist, like Eisenhower the warfighting strategist, saw command organizations—systemic factors—as absolutely crucial to the coherence of his command's strategy.⁶⁹

In terms of actual programs, Eisenhower believed that European cooperation leading toward military and political integration was the cornerstone of NATO efficiency. "I am coming to believe," he wrote in his diary, "that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a U.S. of Europe..."⁷⁰ The American propensity to raise integration and centralization to a philosophical tenet, as reflected in the careers of John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford, and many other cultural icons, found a welcome disciple in Eisenhower. Whether unification of the American military

services or unification of Europe, he saw only benefits without any apparent suspicion of those pathologies of over-centralization which would become evident to late-20th century businesses and governments. To phrase it differently, Eisenhower saw centralization at the strategic level as *linear* rather than as a *dyadic* element that must be in harmony with decentralization.

Attitudinal efficiency is closely linked with (and perhaps indistinguishable from) morale. Maximum effort on the part of individuals, after all, will only come when they believe strongly in the cause they support, are confident that their exertions can make a difference, have faith in their own abilities, and trust their leaders and comrades. Morale augments all other human capabilities and increases the ability of individuals to withstand stress, fear, and anxiety. Given this, the rejuvenation of morale was Eisenhower's second great theme as SACEUR.

This was not easy. As Eisenhower wrote:

Apprehensions about a potential aggressive move against the West provided the starting point for a common alliance for survival. But we were not at war. The absence of an imminent threat meant the absence of strong motivation.¹⁷¹

Furthermore, at the end of the 1940s Western Europe still suffered from a general, debilitating post-war malaise. Lingering war-weariness undercut attempts to resuscitate European military strength. This passivity was heightened by the efforts of pro-Soviet or Soviet-front political organizations and parties throughout Western Europe, and, ironically, by the apparent willingness of the United States to shoulder the burden of Western economic reconstruction and defense.

Eisenhower thus saw his first enemy as Western lassitude rather than the Red Army. He was convinced that American assumption of the defense of Western Europe was unnatural and, in the long term, unsustainable. This belief was based not only on the traditional isolationist strain in American strategic culture, but on what Eisenhower considered a general axiom of international security. "It is clear," he wrote, "that no principal portion of the world can be constantly defended by

forces furnished from another portion of the world."¹⁷² The key was finding "how to inspire Europe *to produce for itself those armed forces that, in the long run, must provide the only means by which Europe can be defended.*"¹⁷³

The United States, according to Eisenhower, could do this in three ways. The first was direct leadership within Western Europe and NATO—creating "greater understanding, greater fervor, greater faith."¹⁷⁴ This was, in fact, the chief role of Eisenhower himself given his notoriety and popularity. The problem was that in deterrence, morale is dyadic and not linear. It was possible to dangerously over-enflame the public, especially in the United States where traditional strategic culture stressed the all-or-nothing nature of conflict. Eisenhower, with an increasingly sophisticated understanding of strategy, was aware of this and knew that an overly-aroused and active America could spawn further European passivity. For Eisenhower, then:

[T]he question becomes as to how to fix or state our assistance plan so that every person can struggle toward a definite objective and yet *not* state the problem in such terms as to ignore our basic purpose which is to re-create the morale that will insure the *self-defense* of Europe.¹⁷⁵

This line of reasoning led to the second way that the United States could inspire Europe: through our own unity and steadfastness. "Our country is the keystone of the entire structure," he wrote to Edward J. Bermingham, "and our unity before the world must be unassailable."¹⁷⁶ As SACEUR, Eisenhower could encourage this type of American effort through his contacts with the Congress, civic groups, and the press, but the burden fell on the Truman Administration rather than military leaders.

The third way was through continued provision of physical evidence of our support, including economic assistance, military supplies, and troops. This was to be temporary in that the United States would "provide the initial impetus to the program through assistance in the equipping of forces, with maintenance, replacement and other future outlays shouldered by the European nations at the earliest practicable

time."¹⁷⁷ After that, the United States would serve "as a storehouse of munitions and equipment."¹⁷⁸ Again, the role of SACEUR in this type of effort was constrained, and thus Eisenhower remained essentially a cheerleader.

Mitigators.

By the end of his tenure as SACEUR, Eisenhower was satisfied with his performance and felt that NATO was well on its way to building credible deterrent force in both the military and political sense. What pleased him most was that this had been done without damage to the American economy or the economic reconstruction of Europe.¹⁷⁹ Although he never phrased it precisely this way, Eisenhower was also happy with his accomplishments in the face of an extensive range of mitigators on strategic coherence.

For any military strategy aimed at deterrence, the most powerful mitigator is the essential nature of deterrence itself. In deterrence, for example there are no clear indicators of success. The deterrer, after all, can never know whether he prevented aggression or whether the enemy never intended to attack. Even more problematic, deterrence is imbued with ambiguity. It occurs in a cold war setting, sometimes veering toward outright war and sometimes toward peaceful competition, but constantly hovering between the two. This means that the role of military power is in flux and must always be understood in relation to other elements of national power. Economic and political factors, Eisenhower noted, "enter into *everything* we do."¹⁸⁰

Americans, with their peculiar strategic culture, have a difficult time dealing with this kind of fluidity and ambiguity. We much prefer situations of unmitigated peace or unmitigated war. Then we understand the rules. We know (or at least believe) that in peace, the utility of military power is limited and the influence of military officers should be constrained. There is no need for the mobilization of impassioned national will which is, after all, a danger to individual freedom once ignited. In war the shackles are off, military power is the priority,

national fervor is desirable, and military officers become central players in the crafting of national strategy.

But despite the enduring appeal of such all-or-nothing type of clarity, deterrence is invariably steeped in ambiguity. Strategists—both civilian and military—must engineer preparation without unnecessary intimidation, public support without uncontrollable passion. Deterrence strategy, in other words, is almost purely dyadic, and this is a realm where Eisenhower in particular and Americans in general did not excel. Ambiguity thus forms a powerful mitigator on strategic coherence.

As Army Chief of Staff and as SACEUR, Eisenhower also found that his secondary, at times peripheral, role in the formulation of strategy was also a mitigator. There were instances where he had a clear notion of what needed to be done, but simply did not have the authority or power to translate this into *official strategy, policy, or doctrine*. Put plainly, Eisenhower as Chief of Staff or SACEUR was much less influential than as Supreme Commander in World War II. He thus had to rely greatly on his civilian counterparts. As he wrote to Averell Harriman:

I can take up non-military things with friends in each of the governments as I visit them, but this is not good enough. We must have a dynamic and forceful campaign of enlightenment of all NATO populations, and this means that the inspiration must come largely from civilian sources.¹⁸¹

The actual process of demobilization of the wartime military and economy, driven as it was by war-weariness, also was a mitigator on strategic coherence. The prime criterion for demobilization was not the orderly transition from a wartime economy and military force to a robust civilian one, but speed, pure and simple. Again reflecting our traditional strategic culture, Americans felt that sacrifice for national security was something that occurred in wartime, not peacetime. Even when the Truman Administration was able to mobilize public and congressional support for the cold war by casting it as a new variant of war, military leaders, including Eisenhower, still

felt that the resources they were given were inadequate for the task at hand.

The coherence of Eisenhower's deterrent strategy also suffered from a lack of role clarity. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SACEUR were new positions without a body of tradition to establish the power, prerogatives, and constraints of their occupants. This was particularly evident in NATO. Eisenhower himself, while comfortable with the political and morale-building nature of his job, was never fully clear as to the actual military function of the SACEUR.

The Soviets themselves also served as a mitigator on the coherence of Eisenhower's strategy. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, they heightened the ambiguity of the cold war by acting and configuring their own forces in a way that presented a clear threat to trained strategists but not to publics and political leaders less well-schooled in the eddies of conflict. Skillful strategy on the part of the enemy always erodes one's own strategic coherence, and the Soviets, spawned in a system fueled by subterfuge, fear, and intimidation, were naturally good at cold war.

Finally, as a deterrent strategist, Eisenhower suffered from a common but ironic mitigator on strategic coherence—success. His natural tendency was to take what worked in World War II and attempt to import it into his deterrent strategy. It took time for him to adapt to the fundamental differences between warfighting and deterrence. This tendency to "stick with what works," however attuned to traditional American pragmatism, was astrategic. Eisenhower never understood that the inherently limited lifespan of strategic success means that what works today may not—or probably won't—work tomorrow as the enemy reacts and adapts.

Assessment.

Given the complex web of mitigators he faced, Eisenhower was able to help craft a military strategy that was, in some ways, remarkably coherent. Even though not a visionary in any sense, he was forward-looking in his understanding of the need for a holistic or total strategy, for global U.S. engagement

and leadership, for the indirect application of American military power, and for closer cooperation among the military services.

On the other hand, Eisenhower failed to grasp key trends in the evolution of warfare, especially at the poles of the spectrum of conflict. He did not, for example, develop a comprehensive understanding of the implications of nuclear weapons during his tenure as Chief of Staff and SACEUR. Equally, he did not understand what is now called low intensity conflict. Commenting on the French war in Indochina, he did note that "no military victory is possible in that kind of theater..."¹⁸² On the other hand, he remained convinced that the war in Indochina and others like it were strictly skirmishes in the "global conflict against a Communist dictatorship."¹⁸³

Eisenhower developed at least a sound understanding of the essence of a deterrence-based military strategy. For example, even though he, like most Americans, did not fully grasp the relationship of force and diplomacy, he did recognize the secondary role of military power in American grand strategy. Even while Chief of Staff and SACEUR, Eisenhower stressed the centrality of economics. This would later become a trademark of his grand strategy as president. He also sensed the dyadic nature of morale in deterrent strategy, and sought that difficult balance between vigilance and passion. Finally, he saw that the key role of American military power was indirect—to serve as suppliers, movers, trainers, and, when absolutely necessary, a global strategic reserve—and attempted to translate this into strategy.

Deterrence always has three components: capability, communication, and credibility. The deterrer must have the physical ability to punish an aggressor or deny him victory; he must make sure that potential aggressors understand this capability; and he must assure that potential aggressors believe that this capability will be used to counter aggression. Of the three components, Eisenhower focused on capability. This is logical. Capability is the groundwork of deterrence and, in the post-World War II period, was the component most directly challenged by political pressure for demobilization and disengagement. Force development was thus a key element of Eisenhower's strategic leadership. Furthermore, he did

what he could do for credibility which, in part, arises from the readiness of military forces. Eisenhower knew this, and stressed training and other components of readiness.

In terms of a major shortcoming, Eisenhower as Chief of Staff and SACEUR had only a vague sense of the actual means of employing the forces he helped develop. And then, most of his thinking was a rehash of World War II. This was most evident in the vague notions developed for warfighting by NATO, but even the Army he helped create reflected the realities of World War II rather than the future.¹⁸⁴ Hence the steadiness but lack of true vision or creativity which characterized Eisenhower's approach to warfighting strategy reemerged in his deterrent military strategy. As in World War II, what a Leninist would call the "global correlation of forces" was such that this did not lead to disaster, but it also did not spawn the most coherent strategy possible.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

Grand Strategy.

For Eisenhower, the transition from a warfighting to a deterrent strategist was a major one. As a warfighting strategist, he had the luxury of steady increases in the quantity and quality of available resources, including both troops and material. As a deterrent strategist, he faced declining resources. Uncomfortable trade-offs were the order of the day and defining the level of risk acceptable in an environment of amorphous threat became a central planning procedure.¹⁸⁵ In addition, the fundamental nature of the risk changed from the danger of faltering public or allied support which he faced during World War II to the more ominous threat of outright defeat. This meant that the dyadic dimension of strategy, the balancing, harmonizing, and trade-offs, were more important to Eisenhower-the-deterrent than to Eisenhower-the-warfighter.

The same held when Eisenhower served as engineer of our grand strategy. He assumed the presidency convinced that major alterations were needed in American national security policy. Eisenhower was convinced that containment, as it developed under Truman, was incoherent and immorally passive. According to the General's calculations, the Truman strategy had allowed 100 million people a year to slip under Communist control.¹⁸⁶ As a student of strategy, Eisenhower believed in the value of the initiative, and felt that Truman had surrendered it.

Even more importantly, Eisenhower was worried that Truman's military buildup had made American grand strategy insolvent. American prosperity and economic health, he believed, undergirded all other elements of our strategy. The

high taxes required by the Truman strategy endangered this and could erode public support for the strategy. According to a basic statement of U.S. national security strategy prepared by the National Security Council, "Continuation of this course of action over a long period of time would place the United States in danger of seriously weakening its economy and destroying the values and institutions which it is seeking to maintain."¹⁸⁷

Eisenhower's response was to shape an altered American grand strategy—the "New Look"—which sought to integrate political, psychological, economic, and military components in a coherent but frugal way. Continuity was the byword. The New Look was imbued with themes, ideas, features and characteristics developed when Eisenhower dealt exclusively with military strategy, but attempted to translate these into the more complex arena of grand strategy.

The military dimension of the New Look stressed strategic nuclear weapons.¹⁸⁸ Reliance on conventional military force for deterrence was extravagant in its use of valuable resources. And, should the military actually be used, it was potentially expensive in human terms. But this problem could be overcome. The American advantage in numbers of nuclear bombs and in delivery systems could be used to minimize the need to match Soviet conventional forces. In the words of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, the way to attain "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost" was to reinforce local conventional defenses with "massive retaliatory power."¹⁸⁹ Hence massive retaliation became a cornerstone of the Eisenhower military strategy.

Massive retaliation required serious consideration of the utility of nuclear weapons. While Truman must have given sober thought to the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons—particularly in response to non-nuclear aggression—he never spelled out these conditions. Eisenhower and Dulles often implied that a nuclear response to certain types of non-nuclear aggression was likely. Despite concern for nuclear disarmament later in the Administration, the early Eisenhower strategy reflected John Foster Dulles' view "that somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the use of

these weapons."¹⁹⁰ And this was not a bluff. Basic strategy documents show that Eisenhower was clearly willing to consider the first use of nuclear weapons as a means of ameliorating strategic risk at a low economic cost. In his memoirs, Eisenhower wrote "My intention was firm: to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy evidence of a general attack against the West."¹⁹¹

Once the Administration decided to rely on nuclear weapons, it set out to garner support for this move and to implement it. Within the defense establishment, emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons paved the way for Army support of cuts in conventional forces.¹⁹² Dulles and other officials, including Eisenhower, made many attempts to explain massive retaliation to the American public. Eisenhower's aides convinced NATO of the credibility and efficacy of what came to be called "extended deterrence."¹⁹³ And the Administration instigated a number of programs to upgrade U.S. nuclear forces. The Minuteman, Polaris, B-47, B-52, and B-58 were all children of the New Look.¹⁹⁴ As an adjunct, civil and continental defense programs received increased resources.¹⁹⁵

Eisenhower accorded conventional military forces a relatively minor role in the cold war. He believed that any war between the superpowers would inevitably involve the early use of nuclear weapons. Should the conflict persist, conventional armies could be mobilized.¹⁹⁶ In smaller wars, allies would provide most of the land forces. "Our allies along the periphery of the Iron Curtain," Eisenhower wrote, should "provide (with our help) for their own local security, especially ground forces, while the United States, centrally located and strong in productive power, provided mobile reserve forces of all arms, with emphasis on sea and air contingents."¹⁹⁷

As NATO's first commander, Eisenhower had recognized that reliance on American power for protection of Europe could lead our allies to minimize their own defense efforts and thus erode American support for the strategy. As president he continued to support the European Defense Community and increased defense spending by the NATO allies.¹⁹⁸ This, however, was to little avail, and throughout the life of the New

Look, the United States bore a disproportionate share of the burden for European security.

The Eisenhower Administration did not stop at this blend of extended deterrence, alliances, and mobile reserves. The President and his top advisers realized that traditional American attitudes toward military force, which, as Robert Osgood argued, disassociated power and policy, did not fully fit in a cold war setting.¹⁹⁹ To Administration strategists, paramilitary covert action appeared to offer a partial curative. Eisenhower inherited the basic institutional structure for covert action. During the initial stages of the New Look, however, the poor prospects for covert activity in the Soviet Bloc led to skepticism about the value of this tool.²⁰⁰ But as European influence in the Third World waned, covert action took on greater importance, and the Administration set out to develop the capacity and willingness to use it.²⁰¹ The Eisenhower Administration thus represented "the heyday of American covert action."²⁰²

New Look economics were primarily designed to encourage American prosperity. This was not only desirable in itself, but also a central component of national security.²⁰³ According to one of the earliest Eisenhower Administration studies of American strategy, "A vital factor in the long-term survival of the free world is the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy."²⁰⁴ In part, this reflected the old "arsenal of democracy" thinking. A healthy U.S. economy was necessary to undergird military power. Stockpiling of strategic materials formed part of the solution, and Eisenhower saw this as vital for the New Look.²⁰⁵ Industrial mobilization was even more important. In response to serious problems encountered at the beginning of the Korean War, Defense Mobilization Order VII-7 (August 25, 1954) made the Department of Defense responsible for maintaining facilities, machine tools, production equipment, and skilled workers for wartime needs.²⁰⁶ But within a few years, Eisenhower Administration strategists became convinced that the New Look made even a Korea-type conventional conflict unlikely. Led by the Air Force, the Administration began to assume that any war would be a total

nuclear conflict fought with weapons on hand at the start, and thus attention to mobilization declined.²⁰⁷

American economic power was also to undergird self-defense by allied nations. As an Eisenhower Administration document asking Congress for continued support of the Mutual Security Program noted, "Enduring military strength cannot be built on a shaky economic foundation. Nor can freedom itself live for long in an atmosphere of social stagnation and marginal living standards."²⁰⁸ The Marshall Plan applied such logic to Western Europe, but Eisenhower was keenly aware that the same truth held for the emerging Third World. There, especially economic development, stoked by American assistance, was as much an implement of containment as a means to assure access to raw materials.²⁰⁹

In an even broader sense, American prosperity was to circumvent the economic stagnation that opened the door for Communist subversion. Since democracy depended directly on economic health, the arsenal of democracy would provide not only the tools of war, but also the means for creating a foundation for political stability which, in turn, would limit Soviet influence. "Squalor and starvation," Eisenhower explained, "worked to the advantage of Communist ambitions."²¹⁰ Security and economic assistance from the United States was based on a type of triage. The United States would directly help the weakest and most geostrategically important nations. Our European allies would then assume responsibility for areas where the United States was not active.²¹¹ This was especially true for Africa where the New Look assumed that even following decolonization, the former European colonial powers would retain responsibility for economic development.²¹² The United States, correspondingly, would play an increasing role in the Far and Middle East.²¹³

Beyond the tangible advantages of American economic strength, prosperity was also a powerful psychological weapon. For the American people, economic growth would mitigate the costs of the cold war and bolster public support. Internationally, American prosperity would serve as a beacon for those torn between free enterprise and the allures of

communism.²¹⁴ According to an NSC study, "The ability of the free world, over the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples."²¹⁵

Initially the Administration thought that implementing the economic component of the New Look would be easy. Military strategy required active measures against a malevolent foe and error could spawn holocaust. Prosperity, on the other hand, required only a balanced budget, lower taxes, and limited inflation.²¹⁶ The productive genius of the American people would do the rest.²¹⁷ It did not take long, however, for Eisenhower to realize that vested economic interests were nearly as implacable foes as the Soviets, especially the "military-industrial complex."²¹⁸

Politically, the New Look placed great value on the maintenance of alliances. Given the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Union, it was forced to pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy. This meant that "no nation outside the Iron Curtain can afford to be indifferent to the fate of any other nation devoted to freedom."²¹⁹ It was thus vital to convince allies (and potential allies) of the U.S. commitment to their defense and advancement.²²⁰ To do this, the New Look sought to develop political unity, strength and determination in the free world by a range of political and psychological measures: extend good offices to resolve free world controversies (including decolonization); and, encourage the formation of further mechanisms for collective security and mutual defense.²²¹

The political component of the New Look also called for continued American support for international organizations. Eisenhower advocated collective security through international organizations well before his presidency. In fact, his enthusiasm for the United Nations was somewhat at odds with his conservative peers.²²² Despite the deadlock of the Security Council engendered by the cold war, Eisenhower stated that the United Nations "still represents man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield."²²³ Even well into his first administration, Eisenhower lauded the U.N. and argued that it was entering its second decade "with a wider

membership and ever-increasing influence and usefulness.²²⁴ Faced with the cold war stalemate in the U.N. Security Council, the Eisenhower Administration also supported collective security by regional international organizations.²²⁵

The final component of the New Look was psychological. Eisenhower saw the cold war as "an attack on the minds of men" with world opinion the battlefield.²²⁶ Perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs were crucial weapons. Eisenhower understood the essential psychological structure of the cold war (at least as relates to Europe and North America) much better than Truman. The old soldier recognized that even the best trained and equipped troops were useless without good morale, and set out to integrate this simple truth into American grand strategy.

The Truman Administration created the institutional structure for psychological warfare.²²⁷ Still, the Eisenhower Administration felt that the Truman efforts, which dealt mostly with psychological operations during general war, were not far-ranging or holistic enough.²²⁸ Eisenhower thus directed organizational streamlining and policy changes to broaden the span of U.S. psychological warfare. The actual content of the New Look's psychological strategy was built on the intrinsic appeal of the American system. If the differences in the American and Soviet systems are publicized, Eisenhower believed, our system will prevail.²²⁹

Liberation was the key theme of the psychological strategy. As the New Look initially took shape, this meant liberation of Soviet satellites. Moscow's divide-and-conquer techniques were to be turned around: American strategy would "place the maximum strain on Soviet-satellite relations and try to weaken Soviet control over the satellite countries."²³⁰ But however much Eisenhower understood the perceptual contours of the cold war, he overlooked one of the most basic elements of psychological warfare: threats unsupported by tangible power have a limited lifespan and utility. Thus while Eisenhower promised "to render unreliable *in the mind of the Kremlin rulers* the hundreds of millions enslaved in the occupied and satellite nations,"²³¹ he was not willing to back it with military force. Failure to aid the Hungarian uprising of 1956 proved this and

eroded any remaining psychological value of liberation in the Soviet bloc.²³² Support for liberation in the Third World proved equally shallow. Privately, at least, Eisenhower prodded the European powers on the pace of decolonization.²³³ Publicly this was counterbalanced by warnings from the State Department that "premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive."²³⁴

The domestic component of the psychological strategy was even more central. Eisenhower fully grasped the transitory nature of American support for the costs of global responsibility. Fear of isolationism played a large part in convincing Eisenhower to seek the presidency in 1952, and he believed that it still lurked just below apparent public support for the cold war. Thus the New Look called for explicit steps to preserve support for American strategy, and Eisenhower himself pursued this tirelessly.²³⁵

In the end, the New Look exhibited both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach to strategy Eisenhower had honed as Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff, and SACEUR. He recognized that in an environment of constrained resources and amorphous threat, the linear component of strategy was secondary. The threshold where the cost of more resources seemed to outweigh the benefits was simply lower than in wartime. Thus the focus was on the dyadic.

Here Eisenhower continued his stress on the managerial rather than the entrepreneurial. Despite some dynamic early rhetoric, there was almost nothing that was creative or bold in his grand strategy. It was steady, cautious, and persistent. Given all this, a final assessment of the strategic coherence of the New Look is necessarily mixed. It was not markedly worse than the strategies which preceded and followed it, but then again, it was not fundamentally different.

Assessment.

In many ways, Dwight Eisenhower was the archetypical American military strategist. Though unusual in the extent and length of his influence, the enduring characteristics of his approach to strategy were those of several generations of

American strategists. Put differently, he was unique only in the level of his accomplishments. This is part of his allure. We may study more atypical commanders such as MacArthur and Patton and draw lessons from them, but it is Eisenhower who best shows us the ultimate strengths and shortcomings of American military strategy.

Despite fits of self-criticism, there are many strengths in the American approach to military strategy. These include steadiness, a genuine sense of care for troops, careful attention to the linear component of strategy, sensitivity to public perceptions of military operations, and a functional attitude toward military/civil relations that defers to civilian leaders but prefers to not let political concerns dominate military decisions. Resistance to the full blending of the military and the political is consummately American. After all, one of the reasons that Clausewitz is given so much attention in American military education is because his dictums concerning the relationship of policy and war are not intuitively obvious to officers reared in our peculiar strategic culture.

Eisenhower's military strategy also exhibited the enduring weaknesses of the American approach to strategy. He was inconsistent at harmonizing the dyadic elements of strategy and almost always stressed the tangible results of the application of military power over the psychological. The greater the ambiguity of the context in which military power was applied, the more serious these weaknesses. They did not drastically inhibit Eisenhower's warfighting strategy, but placed limitations on his approach to deterrence. Without a temporary monopoly of nuclear weapons and superiority in methods for their delivery, these weaknesses could have proven deadly. We were, in a very real sense, lucky. Eisenhower was a skilled practitioner of precisely those things which worked in the security environment of the 1940s and early 1950s.

What lessons, then, can we draw from Eisenhower's career as a military strategist? There are many, but a few are most stark.

First, Eisenhower showed the vital nature of symbiotic relationships among strategists. He recognized his

shortcomings and developed functional ties with counterparts strong in talents where he was weak—Bedell Smith, Patton, Marshall, etc. Ironically, this penchant for developing symbiotic relationships showed strength in an often-overlooked dimension of the dyadic realm. Put simply, great leaders regulate their egos with a sense of their weaknesses. No one reaches the pinnacle of power without a robust ego which gives them the confidence to lead and to create the command presence which causes others to follow. But nearly all leaders who sustain their greatness over time also have an accurate notion of their own shortcomings. Leaders such as Napoleon and Hitler did not have this, and ultimately they failed. Eisenhower recognized his faults and thus took steps to transcend them. This is a process which all truly great strategists must follow.

Second, Eisenhower's career as a military strategist illustrated the difficulty *and* the importance of careful attention to the dyadic realm of strategy. It is natural for humans to prefer one pole of strategic dyads over the other, to be either hard or soft, entrepreneurial or managerial. Successful strategists sublimate or transcend these natural feelings and develop instead a sense of harmony and balance. To slip into cliché, "all things in their place." A great strategist thus has a penchant for occasionally taking actions which make him uncomfortable or even afraid.

Third, Eisenhower's career illustrated that there were times when the need for creativity, for ignoring proven principles and patterns, can be decisive. In war, such instances often occur when the enemy develops expectations and builds his strategy on them, or when the enemy faces some sort of trauma such as the collapse of German defenses in France in September 1944. In peacetime, bursts of strategic creativity are decisive during times of deep change or transition in the global security context like the beginning of the cold war, or when strategy formulation and strategy itself becomes overly-bureaucratized and stultifying. The tendency in a realm as complex as strategy is to persist in patterns and techniques until they are proven ineffective. The astute strategist senses such obsolescence *before* it is proven, and uses a burst of creativity to establish

new patterns, expectations, and procedures. Eisenhower did not do this, but tended to stick with a technique or method until it failed.

Finally, Eisenhower's career illustrated the need for psychological acumen in strategy. Eisenhower, of course, was an astute psychologist when it came to understanding and motivating colleagues, superiors, staff, and troops. Where he failed was in understanding the enemy or opponent. It is not an overstatement to say that he was *too* American, and thus unable to overcome our natural insularity. Psychological acumen in strategy is not an absolute necessity for an antagonist with an overwhelming advantage in the material realm, but is for an antagonist facing parity or a disadvantage.

In general, Eisenhower, as a military strategist, is a model for emulation when a high cost but low risk strategy is necessary or desirable. He provided tremendous examples of the advantages of the sort of positive interpersonal style so valuable in coalition warfare. But is a high cost/low risk military strategy the way of the future for the United States? In the short term, yes. We will clearly remain militarily preponderant for some years. As *Desert Storm* showed, we have mastered the sort of linear/tangible military strategy that Eisenhower preferred.

In the long term, however, the global security environment will change in fundamental ways. Preponderance is always temporary, and as the quantity of American military power declines (even assuming the quality stays level) and as other nations increase their military power (which they inevitably will), we will need more efficient military strategies. This will demand greater attention to creativity, increased psychological acumen, and harmony in the dyadic component. Hopefully, students of military strategy can learn both the positive and negative lessons of Eisenhower's career and use both to develop these sorely needed skills.

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168. Eisenhower, cable to the JCS, October 3, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 593. The omission of any limitations on SACEUR's use of nuclear weapons is a further illustration of Eisenhower's view of these as normal military tools rather than as strategically revolutionary.

169. Eisenhower, diary entry of June 3, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, pp. 6-7.

170. Eisenhower, diary entry of June 11, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 340. See also *ibid.*, *Annual Report to the Standing Group*, pp. 24-26.

171. Eisenhower, *At Ease*, p. 364.

172. Eisenhower, letter to Lucius Clay, March 30, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 171.

173. Eisenhower, letter to Edward John Bermingham, February 23, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 76. Emphasis in original.

174. Eisenhower, letter to George Marshall, August 3, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 459.

175. Eisenhower, letter to Clay, March 30, 1951, p. 171.

176. Eisenhower, letter to Edward John Bermingham, September 24, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 563.

177. Eisenhower, letter to Congressman James P. Richards, September 19, 1951, reprinted in *Papers*, Vol. XII, p. 549.

178. Eisenhower, *At Ease*, p. 368.

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